Wednesday, 4 November 2026

Republican Loses Both Houses: Brace for a Massive Fall in US Tech Shares This Week

At the time of writing, Democrats have won the House and Senate by flipping deeply entrenched Republician seats. The result is widely read as a backlash against a president whose approval stood near 37% on election day. Markets reacted first, and critics argue Trump’s closeness to the technology industry helped set up that moment.

A common thread can be observed of President Trump’s closeness to technology leaders and the latitude he has given them. Public Citizen reported that Big Tech spent at least $653 million courting Trump and congressional Republicans. Musk alone gave $276 million to Republican causes this cycle; making the administration looking beholden to a few powerful tech figures, and that voters noticed.

The Starlink episode is perhaps the clearest example of the risks arising from the close ties between political leadership and powerful technology executives. Ukraine’s Starlink speeds were capped from 13 October 2026, following Trump’s announcement of a deal to purchase Russian diesel and his decision to waive new sanctions on Moscow. Musk acknowledged that SpaceX had throttled the service and had previously stated that such restrictions ultimately rested with the US president. Musk personally ordered the restrictions and discussed them with Trump, although some US officials maintained that he had acted unilaterally. Zelenskyy warned that the restrictions were undermining Ukraine’s defences.

Raising broader concerns about the US administration’s approach to its international commitments of expanding democracy and a wake-up call to US allies, highlighting how decisions made by the American president, potentially influenced by close relationships with technology leaders, could have far-reaching consequences for other nations. Trump's close ties with major technology executives raise questions about whether countries that fall out of favour with these companies could have their sovereignty compromised.

Second, everyday costs costed the Republicians. Reporting tied Trump’s slide in approval to higher gas and grocery prices, and voters named gasoline, groceries, health care and child care as their main pressures. The tech boom the administration championed added to them. Republicans warned that an AI-driven chip shortage was lifting consumer prices, and a former House committee chairman said it was hurting the party. A Quinnipiac poll found about 73% of voters oppose AI data centres in their community. Democrats also highlighted the tax law’s disproportionate benefits for high-income earners.

US Tech Stocks' Sharp Fall

Markets has delivered their own verdict. US index futures dropped on Tuesday night as projections showed Democrats winning the House, with Nasdaq 100 futures down about 2% at their lows. AI-linked stocks fell around 3-7% each in overnight trading. 

The central worry is tougher regulation. Market participants said stronger Democratic performance could be negative for high-growth tech and AI firms and may hinder US data-center expansion and investors should be prepared to see greater scrutiny of AI and Big Tech and their expansion plans.

Tougher regulation could take several forms. Strategists point to requiring AI developers to shoulder more of the cost of powering data centres, and to greater congressional oversight of trade and technology policy. A Reuters/Ipsos poll found 69% of registered Democratic voters back limits on building data centres, against 43% of Republicans. Even so, analysts doubt a law that significantly stalls construction would pass, and see more hearings and investigations as likelier.

AI industry spending was expected to favour Republicans, who are generally seen as more opposed to strict AI regulation. Bloomberg described the projected Democratic gains in the House as a potential blow to Republican mega-donors such as Musk and the companies aligned with them. With Republicans losing political influence, investors should brace for heightened regulatory scrutiny and potentially significant sell-offs in technology stocks, as markets reassess the sector's political support

Sunday, 25 October 2026

Why Invest in Singapore Properties When Singapore REITs Are Paying This Much Dividend?

Singapore investors are sitting on a rare opening. Quality S-REITs now yield roughly 6% to 9%, with some paying more. That beats fixed deposits, government bonds and the rental income most homes deliver.

No big down payment, no tenant hunting, no renovation bills. Just units on the SGX, with distributions landing in your account regularly.

CapitaLand Ascendas REIT: The Backbone of the Singapore Economy

CapitaLand Ascendas REIT (CLAR) is Singapore’s largest business space and industrial REIT. At S$2.23, its annualised distribution yield is 6.8%, based on first-half DPU.

What does it own? Business space and life sciences make up 44% of the portfolio, logistics 24%, and industrial and data centres 32%.

These are the sectors that keep Singapore running: biomedical research, tech companies, trade and logistics, and the data centres behind the digital economy.

The momentum is real too. Distributable income rose 8.6% year-on-year to S$359.4 million in 1H 2026. Units trade at about 0.99 times book value, so investors are not overpaying for the assets.

United Hampshire US REIT: Higher Yield, Everyday Tenants

For investors who want more income, United Hampshire US REIT (UHREIT) steps up. Its 12-month trailing dividend yield was 8.7% at the 30 June closing price. One analyst estimate puts the FY26 yield at 9.2% at US$0.49.

The strategy is simple: people buy groceries and necessities in any economy. UHREIT owns 21 grocery-anchored and necessity-based retail properties and two self-storage facilities across nine US states.

The tenant base looks sticky. The weighted average lease expiry is 7.9 years and tenant retention is 90%. Growth is showing up as well. First-half DPU rose 3.4% to 2.16 US cents.

Yields This Good Don’t Stay Forever

The numbers speak for themselves. The 10-year US Treasury yield was 4.8% on 2 September 2026, leaving UHREIT with a spread of about 4.4 percentage points. CLAR trades at about 0.99 times book value while paying around 6% to 6.6%. Singapore's deposit rates are only at 1%, while property yields are only at 4-5%

The Singapore REIT space offers something rare: regular income, professional management and exposure to industrial, logistics, data centre and necessity retail assets, all from the SGX.

Pair a blue-chip REIT with a higher-yield name and you get a balanced income stream. For investors who want cash flow, S-REITs are among the most attractive income plays in the market today.

Yields move with unit prices and distributions are not guaranteed, so do your homework before you buy.

Wednesday, 21 October 2026

[High Investment Risk!] Country’s Defence Dependence on One Main Foreign Country

Reports this week suggest Ukraine’s military satellite links were throttled with US involvement, though who ordered it is disputed. 

The Wall Street Journal reported that Musk ordered the military version of Starlink slowed, leaving some Ukrainian attack and interceptor drones practically unusable. The Telegraph, citing four sources, reported that Musk proposed the cap and Trump approved it, clearing the way for the Defense Department to slow Starshield. The cap began on Oct. 14, after the administration urged Ukraine to stop striking Russian oil infrastructure, and Zelensky said he read it as a message from the American government. Musk says limits are decided by the US military and ultimately the president, while Trump and the White House deny involvement and some US officials say Musk acted alone. Whoever decided, a slowdown impedes Ukraine’s intelligence gathering, interceptor drones and long-range strikes.

As a result, Ukraine is now on the back foot, with a greater risk of losing territory.

Dependence on One Major Foreign Defence Provider

The episode shows the core risk of depending on one foreign provider for defence: infrastructure is leverage. Whoever controls a network can throttle it and affect other countries, whether through government policy, a commercial decision or one person’s discretion. The recipient rarely chooses the timing, and can be left unsure of the cause. Ukrainian officials were still trying to establish whether the restrictions were political or corporate, and a state cannot plan its war plans around a decision it cannot attribute.

Dependence also narrows policy options. A country that needs a supplier or another country’s goodwill will weigh that goodwill in every decision, including military ones. Alliances do not remove the problem, because they shift with leaders, elections and domestic politics, and supply guarantees seldom survive a falling-out. Lock-in compounds it: once drones, targeting and logistics are built around one system, switching is slow and costly.

Splitting military suppliers from multiple countriese addresses these weaknesses. Redundancy means that if one source is cut, delayed or degraded, others keep the capability running. Competing vendors give a buyer room to negotiate on price, terms and technology transfer. No single capital can use a supply line as a pressure point. Sanctions, export controls and factory disruptions tend to hit one supplier at a time, not all of them at once. Several countries already work this way. Poland has bought from both the US and South Korea. Singapore buys its main defence heavily from the USA, but its ancillary and small arms fields American, German, French and Israeli systems across different domains.

While Ukraine had some diversification, it remained too heavily concentrated on US technology and equipment, and now faces the risk of a worse outcome in the war.

A reminder for us as well, not to concentrate our holdings in one or two companies *also a reminder of me to avoid adding to my US REITs too, despite their high yield :)

How it Affects Investment

Heavy reliance on one foreign country for defence is a huge risk factor in the current climate. Investors should demand a premium for any country whose defence depends on a single supplier, especially the USA; its current head of state is unpredictable, which means procurement can be delayed or curtailed, leaving a country without sufficient defence infrastructure to protect itself. Investors should be aware of this risk, and weigh it more heavily.

The country risk of investing in a country which has too much dependence on USA is now serious and damning for investors. We should demand a higher risk premieum for such countries.

Tuesday, 20 October 2026

Portfolio Update Oct 2026: Singapore REITs at 7% Yield and above: My $120,000 Annual Dividend Plan

Utilising the sell down in shares, I have reallocated capital; Alibaba (partially), KORE and Goodwill were sold off to buy more NTT DC REIT, Yangzijiang Financial and United Hampshire US REIT. A new REIT, CapitaLand Ascendas REIT, has also been added, as I find the 7% yield a decent risk-reward ratio.

Expected Annual Dividend

Fears of high interest rates/rate hikes have sold down REIT prices, which means very high yields. This has enabled me to accumulate these REITs at prices offering a very high dividend yield; in my view, one of the best investment opportunities in Singapore to build wealth now.

 My annual dividend is now expected to be $120,000 per year.

<not investment advice; dividends not guaranteed>

Sunday, 11 October 2026

Impending French Default: Singapore Interest Rates To Soar and Affect Properties Too

France carries one of the eurozone’s heaviest debt burdens, well above 100% of GDP. A default remains a tail risk, but the damage would extend beyond the French Treasury. It could spread through the banking system and eventually reach Singapore.

French banks hold substantial amounts of French government bonds (OATs), which are treated as safe, liquid assets and used to meet regulatory requirements and provide collateral. A default would force banks to recognise losses on these holdings. Given the relatively thin equity buffers banks maintain against their total assets, even a modest haircut across a large sovereign bond portfolio could erode a significant portion of their capital.

Basel capital ratios would come under pressure. Eurozone sovereign debt denominated in domestic currency has generally received a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach, meaning banks have historically needed to hold little regulatory capital against such exposures. Losses would reduce Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital, while changes in credit ratings and risk assessments could increase risk-weighted assets. Defaulted bonds could also lose their eligibility as high-quality liquid assets, putting pressure on the Liquidity Coverage Ratio.

This could trigger a sovereign-bank doom loop. Weakened banks would require recapitalisation, but the government expected to provide support would itself be in default. Depositors might withdraw funds, wholesale funding could dry up, lending would contract and the resulting economic slowdown would further reduce tax revenues.

Why France Cannot Print Money like the USA

France cannot simply print money to escape the crisis. Although its debt is denominated in euros, France does not control the issuance of the currency; monetary policy is conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB). Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits the ECB from directly financing governments. Unlike the US, UK and Japan, France cannot independently rely on its central bank to create the currency in which its sovereign debt is issued. Its options would be politically difficult fiscal consolidation, debt restructuring or default, alongside any conditional support available through European institutions.

France is therefore a more lIkely candidate to collapse than USA 

Global banking stocks could sell off sharply, with French lenders such as BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole among the first affected. Contagion could then spread through derivatives exposures, repo markets and US dollar funding channels, putting pressure on American and Asian lenders as volatility rises.

Trickel flow of a Property Sell Down Here

Singapore would not be immune. As an open financial centre that relies heavily on global capital flows and deep US dollar funding markets, it could face higher funding costs and wider risk premiums. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) conducts monetary policy primarily through the exchange rate rather than a conventional policy interest rate, while SORA is determined by conditions in the Singapore dollar overnight interbank market. A severe global funding shock could put upward pressure on some Singapore dollar funding rates, including SORA, depending on liquidity conditions and market expectations. Any sustained increase would feed into the compounded rates used for home loans, SME financing and other property-linked debt.

Property would be one of the most immediate areas of concern for households. Many floating-rate home loans in Singapore are pegged to SORA, so a sustained increase could raise monthly instalments as loan rates reset. Owners who stretched their finances to upgrade to a condominium, recent buyers who paid elevated prices and investors with limited cash buffers would be particularly exposed. If borrowing costs rise while household purchasing power weakens, property transactions could slow and prices could come under pressure. Tighter lending conditions and forced sales by overleveraged owners would amplify the downside. Developers with unsold inventory could also face a double squeeze from higher financing costs and weaker demand. At the same time, higher discount rates would put pressure on property valuations, including those of property funds and REITs.

Singapore's banks would face indirect risks even if their direct exposure to French sovereign debt were limited. DBS, OCBC and UOB could experience mark-to-market losses on bond portfolios as global yields rise, potentially affecting CET1 capital depending on how the holdings are classified and accounted for. Lower asset prices could also weigh on wealth management fees, while weaker collateral values and rising loan delinquencies could increase credit provisions and reduce retained earnings. Higher SORA might initially support net interest margins, but any benefit could be offset by higher credit costs and weaker loan demand. Singapore's banks enter such a scenario with relatively strong capital positions, although a prolonged global shock would test their resilience.

The sequence could be a banking crisis first, a fiscal crisis next and, eventually, a property market shock for Singapore. For households with floating-rate mortgages, the consequences could be felt in every monthly instalment.

Friday, 9 October 2026

NTT DC REIT Aligns Fees With Unitholders; Singapore Companies Haven’t

NTT DC REIT has made one of the more unitholder-friendly proposals in Singapore’s REIT market. Its manager wants to replace the current performance fee of 3.5% of NPI with one linked to year-on-year DPU growth. The change is subject to unitholder approval and would take effect from FY2026/27. 

The hurdle is clear. No fee is payable at DPU growth of 3.0% or below; growth above 3.0% earns 0.1% p.a. of deposited property, and growth of 5.0% or more earns 0.2%. The manager will also waive its FY2026/27 fee if DPU falls short of the 7.80 US cents IPO forecast, and fee units will be issued at NAV when the market price is at or below it, limiting dilution. No DPU growth, no performance fee. 

Sharp Contrast to Singapore REIT Managers

Singapore REIT managers like capitaland and Keppel rarely put unitholders interest at a high priority, Hence they are unlikely to follow. Sponsor-backed REITs carry a structural conflict; the sponsor sells, and the REIT its subsidiary buys. Critics argue these REIT managers like to encash proprties at high valautions to their child REIT, while asset growth lifts fees even when per-unit returns lag. A DPU hurdle removes that cushion. 

CapitaLand and Keppel, with sponsor-linked pipelines, hence are unlikely to volunteer one, as they want to keep profits for themselves and have little interest to the Singapore investing community holding their REITs. Their current performance fee is tied to asset size and net property income growth and not to the overall dividend. This structure requires the child REIT to constantly acquire without care to the valuation bought from their sponsor.

Taking NTT DC REIT new payment structure, for the past 5 years, both capitaland and Keppel will receive no performance fee with Capitaland only successfully taking one year of fee. Below is how their track record would compare against NTT's REIT structure.

  • CICT: 10.40, 10.58, 10.75, 10.88, 11.58 cents. Annual growth is +1.7%, +1.6%, +1.2%, +6.4%; 
  • Keppel REIT: 5.82, 5.92, 5.80, 5.60, 5.23 cents. Annual growth is +1.7%, −2.0%, −3.4%, −6.6%; 
Japanese REIT managers has started to take care of the investing community while Singapore REIT managers are unlikely to follow suit.

Tuesday, 29 September 2026

Yangzijiang Financial 1H2026 Results: Deep Discount, Debt-Free, High Dividend Yield

 YZJFH remains one of the most mispriced balance sheets on the SGX. The stock trades at 19.4 Singapore cents. NAV sits at 53.21 cents per share as at 30 June 2026.

That's just 0.36x book. A 63.5% discount to stated net asset value. For a debt-free Singapore-listed company, that gap is too wide to ignore.

Start with the cash. YZJFH held S$575.4 million in cash and cash equivalents at end of 1H2026. Total liabilities were only S$118.4 million.

93% of those liabilities is deferred tax. Not money owed to a bank. Note 21 of the financial period confirms the company has zero borrowings, this period and last.

Strip out the debt book, equity investment entirely. Cash alone covers roughly 85% of the current S$676 million market cap. That's a rare margin of safety.

Now the debt investments book. This is where sceptics will push back. Gross debt investments stand at S$1,323.2 million.

Against that, YZJFH has provisioned S$520.3 million. A 39.3% blended coverage rate. Break it down further and the picture gets clearer. Performing loans (S$466.6 million) carry a 6.2% loss rate. Underperforming (S$189.4 million) sits at 27.6%. The non-performing book (S$667.2 million) is provisioned at 65.8%. That's aggressive provisioning. The 53.21-cent NAV isn't inflated by optimistic bad-debt assumptions. It has already absorbed the worst case. There is a possibility of higher profits baked in if YZJFH recovers more capital than it has provisioned for.

On dividends: YZJFH's stated policy since 2022 is to pay out at least 40% of earnings.  Annualising 1H2026's S$38.3 million profit gives roughly S$80 million for the year. At a 40% payout, that's about S$32 million. Spread across 3.4 billion shares, that's 1 Singapore cents per share. At today's price, that's a prospective yield of 5% for a debt free company

For NAV bargain hunters, this is a rare combination. A cash-heavy, debt-free balance sheet. Conservatively provisioned against its worst assets. Trading at a third of book, with a credible path back to a dividend.