2 Singapore Non-REIT Stocks Giving More than 5% Dividend Yield With Upside

Most investors look to the Straits Times Index (STI), but the mid cap space is now worth paying attention with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) executing the Equity Market Development Programme (EQDP) with about 30% of the government funds set to flow into Singapore-listed mid-cap stocks.

A large portion of these funds has already been allocated to fund managers and will be deployed in 2026. That means mid-caps could see stronger institutional interest.

I’ve filtered three Singapore mid-cap companies with the criterion of:

• Strong trading liquidity and volume to ensure investors are able to buy and cash out quickly

• Sustainable dividend

• Yields above 5%

These companies combine attractive dividend yields with the prospect of increased institutional interest as EQDP capital potentially flows into the mid-cap segment. Given their solid fundamentals and compelling yields, they may deliver competitive — if not superior — total returns relative to MAS-appointed EQDP fund managers.

Riverstone Holdings

Riverstone Holdings Ltd is strongly positioned in the high-margin cleanroom glove segment serving semiconductor, electronics and high-tech industries. It holds the largest global market share in cleanroom gloves.

Unlike commoditised healthcare gloves, cleanroom gloves require:

• Stricter particle contamination control

• Electrostatic discharge (ESD) management

• Consistent high-precision manufacturing standards

These requirements create higher technical and qualification barriers, making the segment structurally more defensible.

Riverstone has built long-standing relationships with global semiconductor customers. Its reputation for reliability supports repeat orders and pricing resilience. Importantly, the cleanroom segment typically generates structurally higher margins than healthcare gloves, giving Riverstone a competitive moat compared to pure healthcare-focused peers.

For FY2025, the company declared a total dividend of 5.5 Singapore cents per share. At a share price of S$0.77, this represents a dividend yield of approximately 7%.

As the company’s production costs and financial results are primarily denominated in Malaysian ringgit, continued appreciation of the ringgit against the Singapore dollar could translate into stronger reported earnings and dividends in SGD terms, potentially enhancing total returns for Singapore-based investors.

Based on my assessment, a fair value of 95 Singapore cents is reasonable, implying a potential capital upside of around 20%. Combined with its dividend yield, Riverstone is an attractive company for investors seeking income and moderate capital appreciation.

ComfortDelgro Corporation Limited (CDG)

ComfortDelGro Corporation Limited is a leading multi-modal land transport operator with a dominant presence in Singapore and an established international footprint.

Its key subsidiaries include:

• SBS Transit Ltd – operating public buses and rail lines

• Vicom Ltd – a major vehicle inspection and testing provider

In addition, CDG operates one of Singapore’s largest taxi and private-hire fleets and maintains joint ventures and contracted operations across several overseas markets. Collectively, CDG functions as a diversified transport conglomerate with exposure across multiple transport modes and geographies.

Public transport is an essential service. Commuters rely on buses, trains and taxis for daily travel to work, school and other necessities, making demand relatively resilient even during economic slowdowns.

In Singapore, the regulated contract model enhances revenue visibility. Operators are typically paid based on service kilometres rather than purely on farebox collections, which supports stable and predictable cash flows.

Both SBS Transit and Vicom are benefitting from structural transport policies, including:

• OBU (On-Board Unit) installation requirements

• Periodic public transport fare adjustments

For FY2025, CDG declared a total dividend of 8.5 Singapore cents per share; at a share price of s$1.55, translating to a yield of 5.4%.

Based on my assessment, a fair value of S$1.90 is reasonable, as I believe the market is undervaluing an essential service operator with resilient cash flows with too high of a yield (currently above 5% yield); a low 4% yield is where it should be at. This implies a potential upside of about 20% in capital appreciation, excluding dividends, CDG is an attractive company for investors seeking income and moderate capital appreciation.

Asian Pay TV Trust, Reduced Dividend, Reduced Target Price

Asian Pay TV Trust (APTT) has released its full year financial results. Below is a summary

Full Year (2025):

• Total Revenue: S$245.7 M (down 2.5% vs 2024)
• EBITDA: S$135.5 M (down 8.7%)
• Broadband revenue growth: +9.4%
• Cable TV revenue: Down 7.5% for the year

From 2026, dividend will be reduced from 1.05 cents to 0.8 cents, a 25% reduction. The reduction in DPU was attributed to a sharper-than-expected EBITDA decline in 2025. The Board reduced distributions to prudently manage cash flow and align with onshore loan repayment obligations. The cut was not intended to accelerate debt repayment, but rather to match scheduled loan servicing requirements.

Management expects EBITDA to continue declining and is monitoring the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio to avoid breaching loan covenants. While there remains sufficient headroom currently, they are mindful that debt levels must be reduced in tandem with declining EBITDA.

Dividend from Broadband business is expected to have a slight decrease due to dilution of the enlarged share capital arising from Dada capital injection into the Broadband Industry

APTT Target Price

A dividend of 0.8 SG cents is the new norm. I still maintain the view that demanding a 8% yield for the trust is fair. Hence target price is lowered to 10 SG cents.

Investors should be wary that APTT may turn to equity raising to retire debt to manage the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio in their loan covenants. 

Feb 2026 Portfolio Update: Purchase of More Yangzijiang Financial

Following the recent sell-down in Yangzijiang Financial Holdings (YZJFH), I decided to rotate a significant portion of my portfolio into the company. To fund this move, I fully exited my position in StarHub and partial stake in PRIME US REIT. I have accumulated a total stake of 240,000 shares in YZJFH.

Post-restructuring, YZJFH has emerged as a focused debt investment platform with a strong balance sheet, holding only $300,000 of debt against a $1.8 billion loan portfolio. Its loan portfolio currently carries a book value of approximately 54 cents per share, supported by a credit loss allowance of 5.2 cents per share.

Taken together, this implies that if the loan portfolio were to be fully redeemed without drawing down on the credit allowance, the underlying value of the company would amount to roughly 59.2 cents per share. Even allowing for some utilization of the credit allowance, the current market price appears to reflect a substantial discount to underlying asset value.

At a share price of around 33 cents, YZJFH is trading at a significant discount to its adjusted book value. In my view, this valuation presents a compelling risk-reward profile.

Next, a small amount was used to buy Goodwill Entertainment.

Current Portfolio Value is $1,244,000. I am still on track to clock $60k dividend this year

Dividend

USD:$0

HKD:$9,068.61

SGD:$0

The End of Malaysia Ringgit Weakness: Why 5% Annual Appreciation Is the New Reality

In 2025, something previously considered unthinkable happened: the Malaysian ringgit appreciated by roughly 5% against the Singapore dollar in a single year.

This move was not random. It was driven by a stronger Malaysian economy and a clear increase in foreign direct investment and capital inflows into the country.

In my view, this is not a one-off event. A continued annual appreciation of around 5% is likely to persist for the next few years. As a result, Malaysians holding Singapore assets may continue to experience an erosion of their wealth in ringgit terms, even if Singapore property prices continue to rise.

That outcome may feel uncomfortable, but it is simply the consequence of holding assets denominated in a currency that is no longer structurally strengthening against the ringgit.

Why the 5% Continued Appreciation Will Continue

The 2025 appreciation of the ringgit against the Singapore dollar was widely dismissed as a temporary anomaly. In reality, it marks the start of a multi-year normalization cycle, not a short-term deviation. As of Feb 2026, the Ringgit has already appreciated 1.3% against the Sing Dollar in just under 2 months.

Several structural forces support the case for continued appreciation.

1. Malaysia Has Entered a Sustained Capital Inflow Phase

Malaysia is no longer merely benefiting from a cyclical recovery. It is entering a structural capital inflow phase driven by:

• Manufacturing reshoring and “China+1” supply-chain strategies

• Significant investments in semiconductors, data centers, and energy

• Large-scale infrastructure spending and industrial ecosystem development

Foreign direct investment is sticky capital. Unlike short-term portfolio flows, FDI does not exit quickly based on sentiment or market volatility. As long as Malaysia continues absorbing real, productive investment, structural demand for the ringgit will rise year after year, placing sustained upward pressure on the currency.

This trend is already visible. Even Singapore-based companies, such as AEM, have begun locating manufacturing operations to Malaysia — a clear signal of shifting regional cost and competitiveness dynamics. In the semiconductor logistics supply chain, Malaysia is starting to set up wafer capabilities, this is an add on when the country is already the largest producer of clean room gloves which are used in the semiconductor assembly and testing stages

This is not a one-year story but a multi-year balance-of-payments adjustment.

2. The Productivity and Income Gap Is Narrowing

For decades, the relative strength of the Singapore dollar reflected a widening productivity and income gap between Singapore and Malaysia. That gap is now narrowing rather than widening.

• Malaysian wages are rising faster than Singapore’s, supporting stronger domestic consumption

• Higher-value manufacturing and services are expanding within Malaysia

• Talent retention and skilled labor participation are improving

Currencies ultimately reflect relative productivity trends, not historical reputation. As Malaysia’s economic fundamentals converge toward those of higher-income peers, the exchange rate must adjust accordingly.

3. Property and Capital Inflows Signal Confidence, Not Speculation

Kuala Lumpur — particularly areas such as KLCC — is experiencing a strong property upswing, with substantial foreign capital inflows.

This is not purely speculative activity. It reflects:

• Improved investor confidence

• Greater institutional participation

• A reassessment of Malaysia’s long-term economic trajectory

These inflows reinforce demand for the ringgit and strengthen the currency’s medium-term outlook.

4. Improved Governance and Investor Sentiment

Underlying these trends is renewed confidence in Malaysia’s current government, driven by clearer policy direction, better governance signals, and a more credible reform narrative.

Investor confidence matters. When capital believes in policy continuity and economic management, currency appreciation tends to be persistent rather than temporary. 

The Bottom Line

The appreciation of the ringgit is likely to continue over the next two years, driven by sustained capital inflows, improving economic fundamentals, and rising investor confidence. On this trajectory, one Singapore dollar could trade near 2.85 ringgit within the end of next year.

If the upcoming Malaysian general election results in the current incumbent government remaining in power, policy continuity and reform momentum would further reinforce confidence in the Malaysian economy. Under such conditions, the uncomfortable truth for many investors is that the ringgit is likely to continue appreciating at approximately 5% per annum with possibility of 2.2 Ringgit mark in 2034. This will mark a clear change of the Malaysia Ringgit being known as a weak currency

AXS Coins New Promotion: How to Get Up to 3% Back on Bills

AXS has launched a new rewards program where you can earn AXS Coins for bill payments — but only if payments are made via the AXS m-Station mobile app and you have logged in with your facebook, google or other social accounts

Important

• Works only on the AXS m-Station app

• App is available on Google Play Store and Apple App Store

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Key Rules to Know (will be updated as and when AXS terms change)

• Minimum payment: S$5 (or S$10 for some categories)

• Maximum rewards: 10 AXS Coins per billing organisation per bill account per month

• Rewards apply to payments made via the mobile app only

• If you have different credit card accounts with the same bank, you can pay it on different day to earn coins. For example you can pay UOB Lady's card on the 1st day, and then UOB preferred platinum on the 3rd day of the month and you will earn 10 coins each

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First-Time User Bonus 🎉

If you’re making your first payment via the AXS m-Station app:

• Enter referral code 5WPJDNHE

• Earn 50 AXS Coins (≈ S$0.90) after your first bill payment

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How to Maximise the System 💡

Step 1: Earn 10 AXS Coins Monthly
Make a S$5 payment monthly to:

• Your credit card company (for cards you actively use), or

• IRAS (On AXS homepage, Select "Pay Bills"--> Select General--> Then IRAS--> Then Individual Income Tax, Retrieve by Income "Tax reference no" is your NRIC/UIN number, including the alphabets)

Next key in the amount to pay.

If you’re making your first payment via the AXS m-Station app:

• Enter referral code 5WPJDNHE to earn 50 AXS Coins (≈ S$0.90)

This earns you the maximum 10 AXS Coins per day to each of this billing organisation.

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Step 2: Redeem Coins for a Mystery Box

• Redeem 10 AXS Coins for a mystery box

• Possible outcomes vary (as per screenshot below)

• So far, each redemption I have done has yielded a S$0.18 AXS voucher

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Step 3: Use the Voucher to Offset Your Next Payment

• Apply the S$0.18 voucher to your next S$5 bill payment

• You’ll still earn another 10 AXS Coins, as long as:

• The nett payment amount is at least S$5

  
  
  

⚠️ Example:

• If you receive an S$88 AXS voucher, ensure your bill is at least S$88

• Otherwise, you may not qualify for the 10-coin reward

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Effective Rebate

• For a S$5 bill with a S$0.18 voucher, that’s roughly a 3.6% rebate

• -

<Write up was done with aid of a free AI tool, credit to it with much appreciation>

Jan 2026 Portfolio Update: First Dividend of the Year

During the month, I took profits on Lendlease REIT after its share price appreciated significantly, reducing my position to 40,000 shares. The capital was reallocated into Yangzijiang Financial Holding.

However, post-demerger, the combined valuation of the two Yangzijiang entities has fallen below pre-split levels. This appears to be driven by structural weakness in China’s real estate sector and a softening shipping market, underscoring the broader economic strain on China amid ongoing tariff pressures from the Trump administration.

A few mid cap and Alibaba have seen a rise in share price; therefore, current Portfolio Value is $1,242,000. I am still on track to clock a $60k dividend inflow this year

Dividend

USD:$0

HKD:$9,068.61

SGD:$0

Investors Should Invest Like Minority Shareholders, Not as Owner of a Company

While the title may sound contradictory, it reflects a deeper reality. Reading and researching about the Singapore REIT sector and how, over the years, retail investors have suffered substantial losses, it dawned onto me the reality of investing in Singapore.

The Lippo Playbook- Enriching Themselves not Singapore Investors

The Lippo Group owns stakes in several SGX-listed REITs, many of which now trade well below their IPO prices. The recurring pattern is familiar:

Properties are sold by the parent company into a Singapore-listed REIT at high valuations, often supported by temporary income support guarantees. These guarantees help justify the valuation during the IPO or acquisition phase. However, once the income support expires, the underlying performance of the assets frequently fails to meet expectations.

The REIT is then left servicing high levels of debt incurred to fund these acquisitions—without the corresponding cash flow to support them. Over time, this results in declining book value, falling unit prices, and permanent capital loss for unitholders.

A prominent example is Lippo Malls Indonesia Retail Trust, which has lost approximately 98% of its share value since IPO. While retail investors bore the losses, the Lippo Group profited handsomely through property divestments and years of management fees.

Where Is the Skin in the Game?

This raises a broader issue: the lack of meaningful alignment between REIT sponsors, managers, and retail investors.

In my view, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has failed to adequately address this structural flaw. The lesson learned by many REIT managers appears to be that they can take excessive risks, while losses are ultimately and majority absorbed by unitholders.

Take Manulife US REIT as an example. Manulife originally owned 100% of the assets but spun it off into the REIT and reduced its stake to below 10% at IPO to meet regulatory requirements. Meanwhile, Manulife continued to earn management fees while operating on a leverage of 10:1with other people’s money. So it only had less than 10% of its original capital at risk. Too much risk was then taken by the REIT manager post IPO through its acquisitions, while employing this strategy of shifting ownership from 100% to 10:1 leverage on "other people money" 

The Lippo Group has followed a similar strategy: repeatedly diluting investors while selling assets from the parent company to the listed REIT at valuations with little margin of safety. Comparable behavior has also been observed among Singapore blue-chip sponsors, including Keppel.

The Captive Buyer Problem

In Singapore, a listed REIT effectively becomes a captive buyer for its sponsor.

A parent company can sell a building it previously owned outright to a child REIT in which it holds only a 10–30% stake. Yet it retains control through the REIT manager, continues to earn management fees, and benefits from leverage funded primarily by retail investors.

This asset-light model is immensely attractive to sponsors: profits are privatized, risks are socialized. When things go well, sponsors earn fees and crystallize gains; when things go poorly, it is the unitholders who suffer most of the losses.

Why Low Price-to-Book REITs Stay Cheap

When a REIT trades significantly below book value, two explanations typically apply:

(1) The valuations are wrong.
In several cases, properties are eventually sold at prices far below their stated appraised values at each financial year end. Prior to the sale, the REIT conveniently revises its valuation downward to justify the transaction—despite both valuations being conducted only months apart.

(2) The valuations are right, but managers refuse to act.
In theory, a REIT trading at 0.5–0.6x book value could unlock enormous value by selling assets and using the proceeds for unit buybacks. This would reduce leverage, strengthen the balance sheet, and potentially deliver significant gains to remaining unitholders.

In practice, this almost never happens.

Why? Because selling properties reduces the asset base—and with it, the management fees earned by the REIT manager. While such actions would benefit unitholders, they conflict directly with the economic incentives of the manager, who is often also the largest shareholder or sponsor.

As unitholders, we may focus on mathematical value accretion. But we must remember this fundamental truth: REIT managers （who tend to be related to the Sponsor） are paid to manage assets, not to maximize unit prices. Such example could be seen in how the parent ESR was managing Sabana REIT.

Minority Shareholder Problem Not Just Happening in the REIT Sector

The challenges discussed in this article are not confined to the REIT sector. More broadly, they reflect a structural issue faced by minority investors in Singapore-listed companies.

In many family-controlled firms, controlling shareholders retain decisive influence over capital allocation and executive appointments. It is not uncommon for related parties to be installed in senior management roles with generous compensation, while dividends to minority shareholders remain limited or inconsistent.

Although there have been instances of shareholder pushback at annual general meetings—such as at Stamford Land and Hong Fok—these efforts rarely lead to meaningful change. Minority shareholders, by definition, lack the voting power to alter outcomes when control remains firmly in the hands of founding families.

The existing governance framework in Singapore offers limited practical protection for minority investors in such situations. While disclosure requirements are robust, economic outcomes continue to favor controlling shareholders, often at the expense of long-term minority returns.

This imbalance has broader implications. Weak minority investor confidence contributes to low market participation, persistent valuation discounts, and a lack of depth in Singapore’s equity market—an issue policymakers are now seeking to address. Without stronger alignment between control and capital, reforms aimed solely at boosting listings or liquidity are unlikely to succeed.