Currently Tuan Sing Holdings is a conglomerate operating in three business areas:
1. Hotel Property
The company owns hotel assets in Australia in Hyatt regency Perth ad Grand Hyatt Melbourne. Both are freehold assets. However, performances has been relatively muted with the company barely breaking even. This segment is not a major profit contributor to the group
2. Property Development
Tuan Sing is increasingly becoming active in this region with the recent completion of its Grade A Singapore Office at 18 Robinson Road which is a freehold land. Similarly, the group is now redeveloping Sime Darby Centre which is a part freehold and part 999 years lease. Furthermore, Tuan Sing recently secured a low 2.80% interest on its bonds, which means its loans will be at a low interest rate.
18 Robinson Road recently started operations in 2019 and has started its leases with tenants and retail shops. Therefore, I am expecting increase in revenue recognised by the company and cashflow from rentals starting from Q4 2019. This will be further improved by the completion of Sime Darby centre in 2020.
Next, the company is currently developing small niche high end projects such as Kandis Walk, these will be additional cashflow generated in the short run from its residential development projects.
Tuan Sing's property development arm is likely to be cash flow accretive for a long period of time
3. Industrial Services
Tuan Sing Holdings owns Stake in SP corporation and Gul Technologies. Profits have been relatively stable but they do not move much beyond the 1 million mark for the group.
Overall, Tuan Sing's business arm of 1) and 3) do not make much to the bottom-line. However, these two segments have been cashflow accretive and been sustaining the company's 0.6 cents dividends.
Expecting More Dividends from Tuan Sing
18 Robinson Road is a Grade A commercial office and retail development in Singapore's city centre. Following the occupancy rate of Grade A spaces, one can reasonably expect 18 Robinson to be 90% leased for both commercial and its retail spaces. The building has approximately 80,000 in square feet of commercial space for lease and about 30,000 square feet of retail.
Ignoring rental yields from its car park space and assuming current commercial rental rate of $11.30 per square foot, retail rental of $5.73 per square feet and 90% occupancy rate, one can expect $11.59 Million in annual revenue for Tuan Sing
From Capitaland Commercial Trust financial results, approximately 70% of revenue flows in as operating cashflow due to cash expenses etc, therefore one can expect 18 Robinson to yield $8.11 Million in annual cashflow
Currently Tuan Sing has 1,186 million shares in circulation, this means 18 Robinson Road is able to add another 0.68 cents in cashflow and in turn, dividends. The company currently has a sustainable dividend policy of 0.6 cents. Hence, it is quite possible for them to maintain a future dividends of 1.2 cents.
I am expecting another round of dividend increase when Sime Darby centre comes online. As both of these properties are freehold status and not 99 year leases like most of other REITs, these cashflow is perpetual in nature and only subjected to property market conditions.
Friday, 18 October 2019
Tuesday, 15 October 2019
Change in American Express Referral Conditions For Amex KrisFlyer Cards
To all readers, the previous content of my post which I blogged about how one could spend $50 to achieve 10,000 krisflyer miles is no longer valid because AMEX has changed their referral T&C from 10 October 2019.
New Condition
So for those who had signed up from 10 October 2019, your Krisflyer accumulation miles are as follows:
a) Your first charge to the Krisflyer card will yield you 5,000 KrisFlyer Miles (provided this is the first time you own and have charged to an American Express cobrand Card)
b) However if you wish to accumulate the next 5,000 Krisflyer miles, you will need to spend $1,000 within the first 3 months of the date of the card approval.
This will help you earn 10,000 Krisflyer Miles in total. Please take note. Should you just wish to get part a), just charge a small amount to earn the 5,000 Krisflyer miles if you are a new cardholder to Amex.
However, for those interested in accumulating for the $1,000 spend. I will strongly recommend using the top up of grabpay method over the span of 2-3 months. Do note your first $200 in grab top up is applicable for 3.1x Krisflyer miles on top of the bonus miles.
Hence the first $1,000 expenditure achieved by you is still worthwhile under the following method:
Hence the first $1,000 expenditure achieved by you is still worthwhile under the following method:
1st Calendar Month (e.g. 1 Nov 2019) - Top up $500 Into grabpay via your new signed up Amex Card
First $200- 630 Krisflyer Miles ($200 x 3.1)
Next $300 - 330 Kris Flyer Miles ($200 x 1.1)
2nd Calendar Month (e.g. 1 Dec 2019) - Top up $500 Into grabpay via Amex Card
First $200- 630 Krisflyer Miles ($200 x 3.1)
Next $300 - 330 Kris Flyer Miles ($200 x 1.1)
Total Points as of 2nd Month = 1,920 Kris Flyer Miles
Add $1,000 Spend = 5,000 Kris Flyer Miles
Total Airmiles Earned = 6,920 KrisFlyer Miles
Hence for $1,000 spent, you will accumulate 6,920 Air Miles (which works out to 6.9 Miles per $1 spent.
While it is weaker than the previous offer I stated where you could only spend $50 to earn the full 10k miles, the current deal is still decent in which you ear 6.9 miles per $1 up to $1,000
What To Spend on Grabpay
As mentioned by my now outdated post, the answer is to use Grabpay to pay for AXS bills via its mobile app such as income tax bills and utility. I have linked a very well-written article by Dollars and Sense which covers how AXS mobile app can now be paid using Grabpay [Link Here]
Tuesday, 8 October 2019
Earn 10,000 KrisFlyer Miles for Spending Just $1000 on American Express KrisFlyer Card
To all readers, the previous content of my post which I blogged about how one could spend $50 to achieve 10,000 krisflyer miles is no longer valid because AMEX has changed their referral T&C from 10 October 2019.
So for those who had signed up from 10 October 2019, your Krisflyer accumulation miles are as follows:
a) Your first charge to the Krisflyer card will yield you 5,000 KrisFlyer Miles (provided this is the first time you own and have charged to an American Express cobrand Card)
b) However if you wish to accumulate the next 5,000 Krisflyer miles, you will need to spend $1,000 within the first 3 months of the date of the card approval.
This will help you earn 10,000 Krisflyer Miles in total. Please take note.
New Condition
So for those who had signed up from 10 October 2019, your Krisflyer accumulation miles are as follows:
a) Your first charge to the Krisflyer card will yield you 5,000 KrisFlyer Miles (provided this is the first time you own and have charged to an American Express cobrand Card)
b) However if you wish to accumulate the next 5,000 Krisflyer miles, you will need to spend $1,000 within the first 3 months of the date of the card approval.
This will help you earn 10,000 Krisflyer Miles in total. Please take note.
However, for those interested in accumulating for the $1,000 spend. I will strongly recommend using the top up of grabpay method over the span of 2-3 months. While your first $200 in grab top up is applicable for 3.1x Krisflyer miles, the totality of the $1,000 expenditure is still worthwhile.
Below is my advised calculation
1st Calendar Month (e.g. 1 Nov 2019) - Top up $500 Into grabpay via your new signed up Amex Card
First $200- 630 Krisflyer Miles ($200 x 3.1)
Next $300 - 330 Kris Flyer Miles ($200 x 1.1)
2nd Calendar Month (e.g. 1 Dec 2019) - Top up $500 Into grabpay via Amex Card
First $200- 630 Krisflyer Miles ($200 x 3.1)
Next $300 - 330 Kris Flyer Miles ($200 x 1.1)
Total Points as of 2nd Month = 1,920 Kris Flyer Miles
Add $1,000 Spend = 5,000 Kris Flyer Miles
Total Airmiles Earned = 6,920 KrisFlyer Miles
Hence for $1,000 spent, you will accumulate 6,920 Air Miles (which works out to 6.9 Miles per $1 spent.
While it is weaker than the previous offer I stated where you could only spend $50 to earn the full 10k miles, the current deal is still decent in which you ear 6.9 miles per $1 up to $1,000
What To Spend on Grabpay
As mentioned by my now outdated post, the answer is to use Grabpay to pay for AXS bills online such as income tax bills and utility. I have linked a very well article by Dollars and Sense which covers how AXS mobile app can now be paid using Grabpay [Link Here]
Monday, 8 July 2019
A Re-look at Accordia Golf Trust
It has been about 4 years since I looked at Accordia Golf Trust (AGT) as an investment proposition. Many things have changed since then and I wondered how it has fared since then.
What has Changed
Dividends- The dividend history of AGT has shown there is a slight decline in dividends. Below is the dividend history.
From its latest Financial Year Ending March 2019, it can be seen that dividends for AGT has been on a decline. This is a far cry from the past where Dividends given were generous.
Sustainable Dividends?
From the cashflow statement for FY2018, AGT gave out JPY$3.4 Billion in Dividends. With the recent release of dividends which is about 2% lower, one can reasonably expect another JPY$3.3- 3.4 billion in dividends provided to investors. However, the question begs- Is the Dividends Sustainable?
In terms of Cashflow wise, it does seems sustainable because AGT is producing about JPY$10 billion in operating cashflow annually before working capital changes, with CAPEX in the past 5 years averaging in JPY$1.5 billion as well as income and interest expenses totalling to JPY$2 billion. It does shows that JPY$3.4billion of dividends (or 3.77 Singapore Cents is sustainable).
Again cashflow depends on the industry outlook and if AGT business does deteriorate by 40% resulting in a similar in cashflow generated, I do expect dividends to be slightly cut
Higher Leverage Ratio
AGT's leverage ratio has slightly climbed over the past few year and now stands at a 30.4% loan to value ratio. This is a rise from its 29% when I last looked at it. The slightly elevated ratio is similar to the levels that are deployed by our local REITS currently.
Conclusion
Hence based on current share price of 53 cents and dividends, AGT is offering a 7% leveraged yield. In my view, it does seem about right. In our current global environment of yield hungry investors, we have seen local REITs being bided down to 4-5% yields albeit in more stable sectors such as Retail and Commercial officer space.
The Japanese Golf Industry seems to be in a slight decline based on AGT's past financial results. Past performance indicates around 0.6-1% decline. However with the pick up in Japanese tourism and the Olympics, my opinion is that revenue will stay in the JPY$50-51 billion range for the next few years. With an operating expense base of JPY$45 billion, the JPY$3.4 billion in dividends does seem sustainable.
Even with a decline in revenue from 2021 onwards, there should still be sufficient cash to pay for dividends and JPY$45 billion debt repayment. With 76% of its land under freehold tenure, AGT has the capability of having perpetual generation of cash to repay its debts. This is unlike our local REITs whose portfolio are majority leasehold land and thus have to depend on our government bailing them out by allowing a lease top up back to 99 years. With such a large proportion of freehold land, AGT has a lowered risk of its assets facing leasehold depreciation or lease expiry, which will in turn result in a loss of revenue.
I do now own any Accordia Golf Trust now but am just observing it to see if it can be part of a dividend portfolio.
What has Changed
Dividends- The dividend history of AGT has shown there is a slight decline in dividends. Below is the dividend history.
Sustainable Dividends?
From the cashflow statement for FY2018, AGT gave out JPY$3.4 Billion in Dividends. With the recent release of dividends which is about 2% lower, one can reasonably expect another JPY$3.3- 3.4 billion in dividends provided to investors. However, the question begs- Is the Dividends Sustainable?
In terms of Cashflow wise, it does seems sustainable because AGT is producing about JPY$10 billion in operating cashflow annually before working capital changes, with CAPEX in the past 5 years averaging in JPY$1.5 billion as well as income and interest expenses totalling to JPY$2 billion. It does shows that JPY$3.4billion of dividends (or 3.77 Singapore Cents is sustainable).
Again cashflow depends on the industry outlook and if AGT business does deteriorate by 40% resulting in a similar in cashflow generated, I do expect dividends to be slightly cut
Higher Leverage Ratio
AGT's leverage ratio has slightly climbed over the past few year and now stands at a 30.4% loan to value ratio. This is a rise from its 29% when I last looked at it. The slightly elevated ratio is similar to the levels that are deployed by our local REITS currently.
Conclusion
Hence based on current share price of 53 cents and dividends, AGT is offering a 7% leveraged yield. In my view, it does seem about right. In our current global environment of yield hungry investors, we have seen local REITs being bided down to 4-5% yields albeit in more stable sectors such as Retail and Commercial officer space.
The Japanese Golf Industry seems to be in a slight decline based on AGT's past financial results. Past performance indicates around 0.6-1% decline. However with the pick up in Japanese tourism and the Olympics, my opinion is that revenue will stay in the JPY$50-51 billion range for the next few years. With an operating expense base of JPY$45 billion, the JPY$3.4 billion in dividends does seem sustainable.
Even with a decline in revenue from 2021 onwards, there should still be sufficient cash to pay for dividends and JPY$45 billion debt repayment. With 76% of its land under freehold tenure, AGT has the capability of having perpetual generation of cash to repay its debts. This is unlike our local REITs whose portfolio are majority leasehold land and thus have to depend on our government bailing them out by allowing a lease top up back to 99 years. With such a large proportion of freehold land, AGT has a lowered risk of its assets facing leasehold depreciation or lease expiry, which will in turn result in a loss of revenue.
I do now own any Accordia Golf Trust now but am just observing it to see if it can be part of a dividend portfolio.
Saturday, 20 April 2019
Far East Orchard Holdings
Far East Orchard is a relatively unknown company on the SGX. However, what I noticed is that it has been constantly declaring a dividend of 6 cents annually. At a current price of $1.27 per share, this translates to a yield of 4.65%.
Is the 6 cents dividend sustainable?
This is the first question I had in mind. While delving into Far East's cash flow, I did not use the reported figure under " net cash from operating activities" but instead "Cash before working capital changes"; this eliminates the chance of companies using trade receivables or trade payables to juice up their operating cashflow. Below is what I found for Far East Orchard:
FY14: $50.9 Million
FY15: $36.2 Million
FY16: $24.7 Million
FY17: $27.2 Million
FY18: $28.9 Million
(Edits with Ghchua Contributions on Investing Cash inflow)
Ghchua has pointed out that Far East Orchard has been receiving cash inflow as dividends from its joint ventures of overseas assts. A quick look into their investing activities shows the varying level of dividends received.
Cash inflow from Dividends of JV, found in investing cashflow:
To sustain Far East's Dividends, the company needs to generate about $26 million. Netting off interest expense (of about $5.5-6.0 Million) and income tax expense, it seems Far East Orchard has a sufficient buffer of cashflow to sustain its 6 cents dividends
Business of Far East Orchard
While Far East Orchard's business is no doubt in properties, this segment can be broken down into 2 further parts - Property Management and property developer.
One positive aspect of Far East is its property management as a REIT manager. Far East is the manager for a business trust listed on the SGX. As a reit manager, a majority of its management fees comes from the asset value of the REIT; this means a rather stable of income for Far East, preventing any downward revision in its future cashflows.
The company too has recently purchased student accommodation projects which should ensure stable cashflow.
However in the sense of cashflow, Far East's property development arm is one which generates inconsistent cashflow- one year can be extremely high, while the next can be low. Looking at its latest annual report, Far East's property Development revenue for the past 2 years has been below 20%. It seems the company is largely dependent on its hospitality assets and business trust for income
Hospitality Arm
Far East has a few hotels in Singapore, Australia, Germany, Denmark and Malaysia. The hotel chain names of "Rendezvous, Oasis and Village Hotel" are one of the largest few brands in the chain.
On the other hand, it runs a business trust called Far East Hospitality Trust, which manages only its Singapore Hospitality property. Far East Orchard is drawing a fixed amount of $12.2 million annually for running the Trust.
This means the rest of Far East Orchard's assets such as overseas hotels and student accommodation projects are contributing to the remainder of the $16 million plus cashflow. Most of these assets are freehold by nature which is definitely better than a leasehold property. From the cashflow, received in its investing activities, it seems Far East Orchard has been receiving about $16 million in cashflow, which will sustains its 6 cents dividends.
In addition, In my view, Far East Orchard has another attraction and that is its ability to sell off its freehold overseas assets into its business trust (who will always be a "willing buyer").
Conclusion
From the above, Far East's 6 cents dividend is sustainable. In addition, with Far East owning numerous freehold assets in Singapore and the rest of the world, it seems a definite that Far East Orchard will be at least able to generate $12.2 million of cashflow even during the worst times.
At its current price of $1.27 with an estimated dividend yield of 4% similar to CPF Long term interest, the company is slightly undervalued. With Far East Orchard additional ability to monetise its overseas assets by injecting it into its Far East Hospitality trust. There seems to be some value to Far East Orchard
Far East Annual Declared Dividends
This is the first question I had in mind. While delving into Far East's cash flow, I did not use the reported figure under " net cash from operating activities" but instead "Cash before working capital changes"; this eliminates the chance of companies using trade receivables or trade payables to juice up their operating cashflow. Below is what I found for Far East Orchard:
FY14: $50.9 Million
FY15: $36.2 Million
FY16: $24.7 Million
FY17: $27.2 Million
FY18: $28.9 Million
(Edits with Ghchua Contributions on Investing Cash inflow)
Ghchua has pointed out that Far East Orchard has been receiving cash inflow as dividends from its joint ventures of overseas assts. A quick look into their investing activities shows the varying level of dividends received.
Cash inflow from Dividends of JV, found in investing cashflow:
FY14: $2.8 Million
FY15: $17.4 Million
FY16: $27.5 Million
FY17: $14,1 Million
FY18: $36.7 Million
To sustain Far East's Dividends, the company needs to generate about $26 million. Netting off interest expense (of about $5.5-6.0 Million) and income tax expense, it seems Far East Orchard has a sufficient buffer of cashflow to sustain its 6 cents dividends
Business of Far East Orchard
While Far East Orchard's business is no doubt in properties, this segment can be broken down into 2 further parts - Property Management and property developer.
One positive aspect of Far East is its property management as a REIT manager. Far East is the manager for a business trust listed on the SGX. As a reit manager, a majority of its management fees comes from the asset value of the REIT; this means a rather stable of income for Far East, preventing any downward revision in its future cashflows.
The company too has recently purchased student accommodation projects which should ensure stable cashflow.
However in the sense of cashflow, Far East's property development arm is one which generates inconsistent cashflow- one year can be extremely high, while the next can be low. Looking at its latest annual report, Far East's property Development revenue for the past 2 years has been below 20%. It seems the company is largely dependent on its hospitality assets and business trust for income
Hospitality Arm
Far East has a few hotels in Singapore, Australia, Germany, Denmark and Malaysia. The hotel chain names of "Rendezvous, Oasis and Village Hotel" are one of the largest few brands in the chain.
On the other hand, it runs a business trust called Far East Hospitality Trust, which manages only its Singapore Hospitality property. Far East Orchard is drawing a fixed amount of $12.2 million annually for running the Trust.
This means the rest of Far East Orchard's assets such as overseas hotels and student accommodation projects are contributing to the remainder of the $16 million plus cashflow. Most of these assets are freehold by nature which is definitely better than a leasehold property. From the cashflow, received in its investing activities, it seems Far East Orchard has been receiving about $16 million in cashflow, which will sustains its 6 cents dividends.
In addition, In my view, Far East Orchard has another attraction and that is its ability to sell off its freehold overseas assets into its business trust (who will always be a "willing buyer").
Conclusion
From the above, Far East's 6 cents dividend is sustainable. In addition, with Far East owning numerous freehold assets in Singapore and the rest of the world, it seems a definite that Far East Orchard will be at least able to generate $12.2 million of cashflow even during the worst times.
At its current price of $1.27 with an estimated dividend yield of 4% similar to CPF Long term interest, the company is slightly undervalued. With Far East Orchard additional ability to monetise its overseas assets by injecting it into its Far East Hospitality trust. There seems to be some value to Far East Orchard
Sunday, 10 March 2019
Singapore Financial Authorities are Doing too Little and in the Wrong Area
In the past few years, Singapore has seen a wide range of corporate failures of SGX Listed companies. Some of them include delisting after a large unexplained fall in prices, spectacular accounting impairments not seen since Enron, lack of material disclosures and corporate governance issues.
All these is leading to a dearth of IPOs and lack of investor sentiments which has seen the latest IPO only being 1.3x times subscribed. If it is difficult for investors to analysis the financials of a company due to poor accounting and lack of disclosures, they are likely to stay away. This is why regulators are present in every country to ensure rules are in place to ensure transparency and reduce the amount of frauds.
Unfortunately, it seems Singapore lacks the above.
Ayondo, the first fintech listed on SGX and probably holds the record for one of the fastest IPO to suspend itself. In March 2018, the company started trading after its IPO at $0.26 per share after approval from SGX and MAS. On the first day itself, the share price fell below its IPO price and went on a downward spiral never to recover again. In Jan 2019, the CEO then resigned after discontentment and disagreement between controlling shareholders, following which it was discovered Ayondo had accounting issues in its financials during the years leading up to its IPO. The company has since suspended itself from trading in Feb 2019- less than 1 year since it IPO'd. Ironically Ayondo is not a local company but has operations only in Europe. Why did SGX and not MAS first ponder over why the company chose Singapore as a listing place instead of European exchanges like London or Germany where its business operations were?
Ezion, the once darling of Singapore oil & gas, underwent restructuring and supposedly announce that its restructuring had been finalised in Feb 2018. It applied for release from suspension and SGX approved the trading of its shares in April 2018. However fast forward to today, the company announced a u turn that its restructuring is not completed despite having a year and the company's share is once again suspended from trading. The only disclosure it made that restructuring was still pending was in December 2018!
Then we have Sinograndness, a food and beverage company. The company is currently languishing at an extremely low price, where its valuation is at a price book value of 0.06 times and PE of 0.6. I am not kidding! However the company has many severe irregularities. Firstly the company did not announce it had defaulted on the loans it received from a Thai listed company. However the Thai Listed company had announced it on their stock exchange on 8 January 2019. Within the next few days, Sinograndness share price fell on the SGX, however the company made no announcements. It was only after 1 week plus did the company finally announce on this default; probably due to the numerous number of complaints sent to SGX by members of the public (including me) on the lack of material disclosure. What is more suspicious is that the company has growing receivables year on year despite a constant revenue and is always deploying its free cash flow back into PPE without much growth.
What Singapore needs are more Investigators and not Analysts
In the past few months, MAS has announced government funds has been set aside to subsidise the salaries of financial analysts and listing fees in order to boost the stock market. In my opinion, MAS is barking up the wrong tree.
The reason for the tepid stock market is because (i) companies with questionable business models are allowed to list, (ii) companies with corporate governance and (iii) accounting irregularities are largely unchecked during their time of listing on the SGX. Such companies are highly susceptible to frauds and doing massive impairments when the writing has been on the wall over the years, prior to its impairment.
Furthermore due to poor investor protection and enforcement by both SGX and MAS to the above points, this results in low quality listings in Singapore. The lack of quality listings outside the STI top 30 and known listed GLCs is causing poor valuation and liquidity. To summarise, what we need is a stronger enforcement regime in Singapore to shore up investor sentiments - MAS and SGX should be channelling funds to hire more investigators or allow its investigation unit to have more leeway to investigate companies with questionable accounting and business models that are currently listed here. This will improve investor sentiment and in turn the stock market.
The Conflict of Interest of SGX
Unlike other countries, where the authority regulating stock listings is one entity (in US, it is the SEC) while the company which runs the stock exchange is a separate entity (NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange etc); Singapore runs on a different model where the regulator and business of running the stock exchange is the same entity - SGX.
This is an open conflict of interest. How can SGX regulate companies when they are also dependent on these companies for revenue via allowing them to list and trade on their stock exchange. SGX would want as many companies as possible to list so as to earn more listing fees.
In my opinion, Singapore should immediately separate the function of regulating listings away from SGX. A separate entity giving it to MAS or another authority should be done as in the examples of USA (SEC) or Japan (Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission). It is bemusing that Singapore merges both regulatory and profit functions into SGX and hopes that the SGX could enforce companies and protect investors when it has to rely on companies for their revenue.
The continued lack of enforcement and subsequent lowered investor sentiment has been affecting the brokerage services of Singapore; as seen in the case of DBS vicker restructuring. Remisiers jobs are on the line as investors confidence falls.
Then we have Sinograndness, a food and beverage company. The company is currently languishing at an extremely low price, where its valuation is at a price book value of 0.06 times and PE of 0.6. I am not kidding! However the company has many severe irregularities. Firstly the company did not announce it had defaulted on the loans it received from a Thai listed company. However the Thai Listed company had announced it on their stock exchange on 8 January 2019. Within the next few days, Sinograndness share price fell on the SGX, however the company made no announcements. It was only after 1 week plus did the company finally announce on this default; probably due to the numerous number of complaints sent to SGX by members of the public (including me) on the lack of material disclosure. What is more suspicious is that the company has growing receivables year on year despite a constant revenue and is always deploying its free cash flow back into PPE without much growth.
What Singapore needs are more Investigators and not Analysts
In the past few months, MAS has announced government funds has been set aside to subsidise the salaries of financial analysts and listing fees in order to boost the stock market. In my opinion, MAS is barking up the wrong tree.
The reason for the tepid stock market is because (i) companies with questionable business models are allowed to list, (ii) companies with corporate governance and (iii) accounting irregularities are largely unchecked during their time of listing on the SGX. Such companies are highly susceptible to frauds and doing massive impairments when the writing has been on the wall over the years, prior to its impairment.
Furthermore due to poor investor protection and enforcement by both SGX and MAS to the above points, this results in low quality listings in Singapore. The lack of quality listings outside the STI top 30 and known listed GLCs is causing poor valuation and liquidity. To summarise, what we need is a stronger enforcement regime in Singapore to shore up investor sentiments - MAS and SGX should be channelling funds to hire more investigators or allow its investigation unit to have more leeway to investigate companies with questionable accounting and business models that are currently listed here. This will improve investor sentiment and in turn the stock market.
The Conflict of Interest of SGX
Unlike other countries, where the authority regulating stock listings is one entity (in US, it is the SEC) while the company which runs the stock exchange is a separate entity (NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange etc); Singapore runs on a different model where the regulator and business of running the stock exchange is the same entity - SGX.
This is an open conflict of interest. How can SGX regulate companies when they are also dependent on these companies for revenue via allowing them to list and trade on their stock exchange. SGX would want as many companies as possible to list so as to earn more listing fees.
In my opinion, Singapore should immediately separate the function of regulating listings away from SGX. A separate entity giving it to MAS or another authority should be done as in the examples of USA (SEC) or Japan (Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission). It is bemusing that Singapore merges both regulatory and profit functions into SGX and hopes that the SGX could enforce companies and protect investors when it has to rely on companies for their revenue.
The continued lack of enforcement and subsequent lowered investor sentiment has been affecting the brokerage services of Singapore; as seen in the case of DBS vicker restructuring. Remisiers jobs are on the line as investors confidence falls.
Sunday, 3 March 2019
How Singapore's Soverign Wealth Fund may cause further damage in the local Oil & Gas industry and eventually Job Losses
I have been reading up on the recent annual reports and financial companies as this is the usual time of statement release. There has been some interesting observation. However one of the most pertinent is what I am seeing is in the oil & gas sector. Below are just purely my views on what may happen in Singapore's Local Oil & gas industry and readers should not just depend on it for investment decisions.
Temasek is trying to profit from the situation and not acting as a backstop
This is my first and most important observation. While we have seen our sovereign wealth fund (SWF), Temasek, putting money into local oil & gas company recently; from what I am seeing Temasek is not acting as a backstop to stabilise the industry but are actually trying to profit from it. One observation is from Marco Polo Marine. On February 2018, it was announced Pavilion, a Temasek Subsidiary, had bought a stake in Marco Polo Marine (MPM):
However when MPM released its latest annual report in 2019 , Pavilion fund appears in the top 20 with a diminished stake from 5+% to 0.93%. All this points to the thinking that our SWF is not going to act as a backstop to the ongoing oil & gas weakness in Singapore. They are in the market to profit and not stabilise the industry which is an economic backbone to our country.
I understand Pavilion too has bought a stake in Ezion which would have placed it in the top 20 with a 4.43% stake. I am willing to venture that in Ezion's latest annual report, Pavilion would have a much lower stake. Even accounting for the equity dilution etc, Pavilion stake in Ezion should not fall below 3%; however my sensing is that Pavilion has offloaded stake in Ezion to that of below 3% to profit on the situation
Banks are probably spooked due to low oil prices and SWF's Actions
As seen from the many announcements made on the SGX, a few oil and gas companies are not receiving working capital funding from banks for their businesses. As AQ from valuebuddies has put it:
Temasek is trying to profit from the situation and not acting as a backstop
This is my first and most important observation. While we have seen our sovereign wealth fund (SWF), Temasek, putting money into local oil & gas company recently; from what I am seeing Temasek is not acting as a backstop to stabilise the industry but are actually trying to profit from it. One observation is from Marco Polo Marine. On February 2018, it was announced Pavilion, a Temasek Subsidiary, had bought a stake in Marco Polo Marine (MPM):
However when MPM released its latest annual report in 2019 , Pavilion fund appears in the top 20 with a diminished stake from 5+% to 0.93%. All this points to the thinking that our SWF is not going to act as a backstop to the ongoing oil & gas weakness in Singapore. They are in the market to profit and not stabilise the industry which is an economic backbone to our country.
Annual Report showing Pavilion Stake in Marco Polo Marine has reduced from initial levels
Banks are probably spooked due to low oil prices and SWF's Actions
As seen from the many announcements made on the SGX, a few oil and gas companies are not receiving working capital funding from banks for their businesses. As AQ from valuebuddies has put it:
Over the past 3yrs, Sam Tsien (OCBC CEO) has been consistently saying that he does not see a "recovery for the OSVs unless oil >60 consistently. This is significant not because he is a great forecaster, but cos he is OCBC's CEO i.e. banks will not lend for oil<60.
Brent bottomed out ~30 in 2016, spent 2017 in 50s, broke 60 in 2018 and hit 85 on 1Oct18. Analysts called for $200 oil.
2nd Oct - Jamal Kashoggi got murdered and oil fell back to 50s and is hovering ~60s now.
For until Trump shuts up and OPEC acts led by Saudis, oil will find it hard to rally, and thus banks will not lend. Unless O&G players intend to fund capex, working capital etc solely out of equity, demand will not pickup. i.e. it all boils down to oil price.
Brent bottomed out ~30 in 2016, spent 2017 in 50s, broke 60 in 2018 and hit 85 on 1Oct18. Analysts called for $200 oil.
2nd Oct - Jamal Kashoggi got murdered and oil fell back to 50s and is hovering ~60s now.
For until Trump shuts up and OPEC acts led by Saudis, oil will find it hard to rally, and thus banks will not lend. Unless O&G players intend to fund capex, working capital etc solely out of equity, demand will not pickup. i.e. it all boils down to oil price.
I suspect the consortium of banks were willing to refi Ezion in 2017-2018 thinking oil bottomed and perhaps thinking state support, but now reluctant since oil collapsed and Temasek ended up being flippers."
The persistently low oil prices and actions of our sovereign wealth fund is causing a credit crisis in our local oil and gas industry
What Happens Next?
Below is my own opinion. It is likely we are going to see more defaults among the SGX-listed companies. This will range from ASL marine asking for more haircut among bondholders to Falcon Energy probably undergoing another round of dilution. Indebted companies in the oil & gas will continue to flounder and more job will be lost.
It is true that oil prices has indeed recovered. But let's be honest, banks here are still not willing to lend. In 2008 our Sovereign wealth funds entered the financial markets and acted as back stopper, via buying and holding onto their stake. This sent a strong signal to the market the worst is over and banks started to lend again; however currently, the actions of our sovereign wealth funds being vultures attempting to profit, instead of a back stopper is likely to cause a credit event in the oil & gas industry. The worst is not over and we can expect more job losses in this industry. I too am bracing for more defaults and equity dilution in one of the largest industry in Singapore.
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