Wednesday, 1 July 2026

Why BYD's Profit and Share price Slide Isn't Over: Supplier Rules from CCP

BYD just posted its fourth straight quarter of falling profits. Share prices fell. However, this decline will continue and normalise only at the end of this year, 2026.

The regulation behind the debt spike

For years, BYD ran one of the auto industry's most aggressive supplier-financing models. It paid vendors an average of 275 days in 2023 and roughly 127 days in 2024, often using its in-house "Dilian" promissory-note platform rather than cash — effectively turning unpaid suppliers into a source of free working capital.

That changed in 2025. Beijing's SME Payment Regulation, effective June 1, 2025, legally caps payment terms at 60 days, and bans forcing smaller suppliers to accept non-cash IOUs as a delay tactic. BYD, along with 16 other major automakers, publicly pledged to comply. By Q3 2025, BYD's payment cycle had collapsed to roughly 57 days.

That's good news for suppliers and for industry health — but it eliminated a multi-hundred-billion-yuan interest-free credit line BYD had been quietly running. The company had to replace it with real, interest-bearing debt.

The Hidden Financing Advantage

  • Total debt rose from 40.5 billion yuan at the end of FY2024 to 124.2 billion yuan at the end of FY2025 — a 207% jump — and kept climbing to 144.4 billion yuan by the end of Q1 2026, a five-year peak.
  • Short-term borrowings alone surged 72% quarter-on-quarter to 66.3 billion yuan in Q1 2026, which BYD attributed to higher financing needs across the group.
  • Long-term borrowings climbed to roughly 61.2 billion yuan by Q3 2025, up more than 640% from the start of that year.

The consequence shows up directly in the income statement. BYD's financial expenses hit 2.1 billion yuan in Q1 2026, up 210% year-on-year — implying a base of roughly 680 million yuan in Q1 2025. That's interest cost that didn't exist a year ago, now eating directly into the bottom line at the same time gross margins are under price-war pressure.

It's likely on a full year basis of 2026, BYD's financial expenses will adversely hit its profits.

The profit trend

Q1 2026 net profit attributable to shareholders fell 55.4% year-on-year to about 4.08 billion yuan, down from 9.15 billion yuan — the lowest quarterly profit since 2023 and the steepest quarterly decline since 2020. Basic EPS fell 56.9% to 0.448 yuan. This extends a streak: Q3 2025 profit fell 32.6%, and full-year 2025 net profit fell 19% to 32.62 billion yuan — BYD's first annual profit decline since 2021. Revenue has now declined for multiple consecutive quarters as the domestic price war and the phase-out of NEV purchase-tax exemptions weigh on volumes.

Price target: 20x forward earnings on the 1Q decline rate

Applying the Q1 2026 vs. Q1 2025 net profit decline (-55.4%) directly to full-year 2025 net profit (32.62 billion yuan) as a proxy for full-year 2026 earnings:

  • Projected FY2026 net profit: 32.62B × (1 – 0.554) ≈ 14.55 billion yuan
  • Shares outstanding: ~9.12 billion (post the July 2025 bonus share issue)
  • Projected forward EPS in HKD: 1.85 HKD per share
  • Price target at 20x forward P/E (do note many automobile makers price earnings are 9-12 times, so 20 is a very optimistic projection)
The target price is HKD$37

Against current prices of HK$72.45 (H-shares) as of July 1, 2026, this implies a further 50–60% downside.

Monday, 29 June 2026

One of the Highest-Yielding Singapore REIT Isn't in Any Index and it is Causing Singapore Investors to Lose Out

If you build your Singapore REIT portfolio around the FTSE ST All-Share REIT Index — the benchmark most income investors use, and one that even REITs like Starhill Global REIT measure themselves against — there's a good chance you've never seriously looked at United Hampshire US REIT (SGX: ODBU). That's the problem.

UHREIT currently trades with a dividend yield in the 8% to 9% range, well above the broader S-REIT sector average of roughly 6–7%. For a market where investors chase every extra point of yield, that should put it on every income watchlist. Instead, it sits largely off the radar — and the index is a big reason why.

UHREIT is Singapore-listed, but its entire property portfolio sits in the United States. Its tenants are grocery-anchored and necessity-based retail: strip malls and centres anchored by supermarkets and pharmacies, leased to tenants considered resilient to e-commerce — restaurants, home improvement chains, fitness centres, warehouse clubs. This has kept its income relatively stable even as its unit price has lagged, ironically property revenue has been increasing year on year because of built in annual rental escalations and long WALE.

So Why Isn't It in the Index?

Here's the part that should give investors pause: it's not earnings, tenant quality, or balance sheet stress keeping UHREIT out. It's trading liquidity.

FTSE Russell's index methodology screens for free float and trading liquidity, not just market cap, to ensure constituents can be bought and sold at scale without distorting the price. UHREIT's smaller free float and thin daily turnover don't clear that bar. And low turnover is self-reinforcing: less liquidity means less index eligibility, which means less visibility, which means even less turnover.

This is a structural quirk, not a quality signal. But because so many Singapore income investors use index membership as a shortcut for "is this REIT worth considering," or just buy the REIT ETF, UHREIT ends up invisible to the very crowd hunting for higher yield. In plain sight, Singapore investors are missing out on a 8.4% dividend yielder!

The Cost of the Blind Spot

REIT ETFs that track the index never buy a single unit of UHREIT, no matter how attractive the yield gets, simply because the rules exclude it. Investors who use "is it in the benchmark" as a screen filter it out before ever checking the lease structure or payout coverage. REITs that benchmark themselves against the index never have to stack up against UHREIT's payout, because it isn't part of the comparison set. The result: capital flows toward index members partly because they're index members — not purely because they're the best income vehicles on the exchange. Singapore investors and fund manager lose out on the extra yield and opportunity to outperform Singapore REIT index any time or date of the year.

The Takeaway

If your approach to REIT investing starts and ends with "what's in the index," you may be filtering out some of the highest-yielding options on a technicality that has nothing to do with income quality.

That doesn't mean buy blind, though. Worth noting: UHREIT's illiquidity isn't a case of a thin order book or wide spreads — there's decent volume sitting on both the bid and ask at most price levels. The "low liquidity" here is really low daily turnover, not a shallow market, which is a more benign form of illiquidity. Still, size positions sensibly and do your own homework on debt maturities, occupancy, and currency risk first. But if you've never considered UHREIT simply because "it's not in the REIT index," that's a gap worth closing — the index is a tool, not a verdict.

Wednesday, 24 June 2026

Singapore's Property Myth: Why REITs Beat Renting out a Property on Pure Math

If you read, watched (or been bombarded) by short form videos by property agents, you would have heard a Singapore gospel: property is the only "real" way to build wealth here. Buy a second condo, rent it out, let the tenant pay down your mortgage, and watch your net worth compound. 

It is also, on a pure mathematical basis, usually the worse trade — once you strip away the emotion and run the actual numbers on yield, leverage cost, tax, and stamp duty. This article walks through exactly why, using a real worked example: a S$1,000,000 portfolio split across ten SGX-listed REITs, compared against the same S$1,000,000 used as a 25% down payment on an Outside Central Region (OCR) condominium that is then leveraged at 75% and rented out.

Comparing an Unlevered Yield to a Levered One — And Still Winning

Here's the asymmetry missed. When people say "property investing is great because of leverage," they're comparing a 75%-geared property to an unlevered REIT portfolio. 

But once you actually run the numbers on (i) Singapore's current gross rental yields (roughly 3.0%–3.8% for private condos in 2026, according to URA-linked data), the cost of financing, the operating drag, and the tax treatment, leverage on a 3.5% gross-yield asset vs (ii) an unlevered REIT portfolio, the maths show REITs win

Setting Up the Comparison

To keep this an apples-to-apples test of capital efficiency, both scenarios start with the same amount of investor cash: S$1,000,000.

Scenario A — REIT Portfolio (Unleveraged) S$1,000,000 deployed directly into a diversified basket of 10 SGX-listed REITs, held with zero leverage, income simply collected as distributions.

Scenario B — OCR Residential Property (75% Leveraged, Rented Out) S$1,000,000 used as the 25% equity portion of a property purchase, with the remaining 75% financed by a mortgage at 2% per annum interest (a realistic low-rate assumption), located Outside the Central Region, rented out at prevailing market rates, and taxed at 15% net of allowable expenses under Singapore's personal income tax treatment of rental income.

The REIT Portfolio: Building the 10-REIT Basket

The portfolio below allocates 60% of capital to four REITs — Keppel DC REIT, AIMS APAC REIT, Lendlease Global Commercial REIT, and NTT DC REIT — split evenly at 15% each, and the remaining 40% across six REITs — Suntec REIT, Daiwa House Logistics Trust, Alpha Industrial REIT (formerly Sabana Industrial REIT), Sasseur REIT, CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust (CICT), and CapitaLand Ascott Trust — split evenly at roughly 6.67% each.

Yields below are approximate trailing/forward distribution yields as of mid-2026, sourced from REIT distribution announcements and market data. REIT yields move with unit prices, so treat these as a realistic snapshot rather than a permanent figure.


REITSGX Ticker (approx.)SectorWeightDistribution YieldCapital AllocatedAnnual Income
1Suntec REITT82UOffice / Retail / Convention6.67%5.0%S$66,700S$3,335
2Daiwa House Logistics TrustDHLULogistics (Japan/Vietnam)6.67%8.0%S$66,700S$5,336
3Alpha Industrial REIT (fmr. Sabana)M1GUIndustrial6.67%7.5%S$66,700S$5,003
4Sasseur REITCRPURetail Outlet Malls (China)6.67%9.1%S$66,700S$6,070
5CapitaLand Integrated Commercial TrustC38URetail / Office6.67%4.8%S$66,700S$3,202
6CapitaLand Ascott TrustHMNHospitality / Serviced Residences6.67%6.9%S$66,700S$4,602
7Keppel DC REITAJBUData Centres15.0%4.5%S$150,000S$6,750
8AIMS APAC REITO5RUIndustrial / Logistics15.0%6.9%S$150,000S$10,350
9Lendlease Global Commercial REITJYEURetail / Office15.0%6.8%S$150,000S$10,200
10NTT DC REITNTDUData Centres15.0%8.0%S$150,000S$12,000
Total100%6.68% (blended)S$1,000,000S$66,830

Result: S$66,830 in annual cash distributions on S$1,000,000 of capital — with zero leverage, zero loan to service, and zero personal income tax.

Under Singapore's one-tier corporate tax framework, distributions from SGX-listed REITs paid to individual investors are not subject to further personal income tax, and there is no dividend withholding tax on Singapore-sourced REIT distributions. The 6.68% you see in the table above is, what you get.

In fact, I have not included my trump card, United Hampshire US REIT in the calculation, a REIT gem which gives 8.5% yield on the back of essential tenant providers who have signed long lease terms with them.

Transaction costs to build this portfolio are trivial — brokerage and clearing fees on S$1,000,000 typically run under S$1,000 in total, a one-time cost of well under 0.1%.

The Property Side: Same Capital, 75% Leverage, Rented Out

Now the property scenario. With S$1,000,000 as a 25% equity stake, the maximum property price under 75% leverage is:

Property Price = S$1,000,000 ÷ 0.25 = S$4,000,000 Loan Amount (75% LTV) = S$3,000,000

At 75% leverage, S$4,000,000 of purchasing power pushes past typical mass-market OCR pricing and into the upper end of the OCR segment, or larger/multiple units — new-launch OCR condos transact broadly in the S$1,200–S$1,800 psf range, so this quantum buys a large landed-equivalent or premium-sized condo, or could be split across more than one OCR property. We'll keep it as a single S$4 million asset for clarity.

Gross rental yields for OCR private condos in 2026 sit around 3.0%–3.8%. We'll use 3.5% as a fair midpoint.ready absorbs and nets them off before declaring the distribution yield: Gross Annual Rent = S$4,000,000 × 3.5% = S$140,000 (≈ S$11,667/month)

Step 2: Strip Out Operating Costs

This is where the buy-to-rent thesis starts leaking. A rented-out private property in Singapore carries real, recurring costs that a REIT unitholder never sees because the REIT manager already absorbs and nets them off before declaring the distribution yield:


ExpenseBasisAnnual Cost
Maintenance & sinking fundFlat estimateS$4,000
Property agent commission1 month's rent/yearS$11,667
Insurance & incidental repairs~2% of gross rentS$2,800
Total Operating ExpensesS$18,467

Net Property Income (before financing and tax) = S$140,000 − S$18,467 = S$121,533

That's already a drop from a 3.5% gross yield to roughly a 3.04% net yield on property value — before the mortgage and taxes.

Step 3: Service the 75% Leverage

The loan of S$3,000,000 at 2% per annum interest costs:

Annual Mortgage Interest = S$3,000,000 × 2% = S$60,000

Taxable Rental Income = S$121,533 − S$60,000 = S$61,533

Step 4: Singapore Income Tax at 15% Net of Expenses

Income Tax = S$61,533 × 15% = S$9,230

Step 5: What's Actually Left

Net Cash Income = S$61,533 − S$9,230 = S$52,303

On the S$1,000,000 of cash equity the investor put in, that's a net cash yield of:

S$52,303 ÷ S$1,000,000 = 5.23% per annum

The above ignores the upfront cost of entry — and a larger property price means a steeper stamp duty bill in dollar terms, even though the percentage is similar. A second residential property purchase in Singapore attracts Buyer's Stamp Duty (BSD) of roughly S$179,600 on a S$4 million purchase, plus legal and valuation fees of around S$20,000 — about S$199,600 total, paid out of the same S$1,000,000 before a single dollar of rent is collected.

Run that forward over 10 years, holding both income streams flat for comparability: the REIT portfolio generates S$668,300 in cumulative cash distributions. The leveraged property generates S$523,000 in cumulative net rental cash flow — and that's before deducting the roughly S$199,600 paid out in stamp duty and legal fees just to get in the door. Net of that entry cost, the property nets closer to S$323,400 over a decade, versus the REIT portfolio's S$668,300 — a gap of roughly S$344,900 on the same starting capital.

Why the Gap Is This Wide

1. REITs are already leveraged at the entity level — you don't need to add personal debt on top. S-REITs typically run gearing of 25%–40% at the trust level, financing portfolio acquisitions with low-cost institutional debt, and what reaches you as a unitholder is the yield after that leverage has already been applied and the associated risk absorbed by a regulated, MAS-supervised structure. Layering a second, personal 75% mortgage on top of a single residential property doesn't replicate this — it just adds risk concentrated in one asset, one tenant, and one location, with a much thinner equity buffer than the trust-level gearing used inside a REIT.

2. REIT distributions are tax-exempt for individuals; rental income is not. Singapore's one-tier tax system means REIT distributions reach you net, in full. Rental income is assessable income, taxed after allowable deductions — and importantly, a private landlord cannot deduct principal repayment, only interest, while still having to fund principal out of after-tax cash flow if the loan amortizes (this example used interest-only financing to be generous to the property side; an amortizing loan would compress the net cash position further).

3. Stamp duty is a one-way, often six-figure tax on entry that REITs simply don't have. BSD and (where applicable) ABSD apply to the full purchase price of a leveraged property — meaning the tax is calculated on S$4,000,000, not on the S$1,000,000 of actual equity at risk. At higher leverage, the same equity buys a larger property and therefore a larger stamp duty bill in absolute dollar terms, even as the percentage stays roughly flat. There is no equivalent levy on buying REIT units on the SGX.

What This Comparison Doesn't Capture

  • Capital appreciation is excluded from both scenarios' income figures. Singapore property has historically appreciated, and REIT unit prices also rise and fall with interest rates, sentiment, and asset values — neither is a "yield-only" asset in total-return terms.
  • Vacancy risk isn't modelled for the property scenario (a vacant month with no tenant is a real, recurring risk for a single-tenant asset that a 200-property REIT portfolio largely diversifies away, and at 75% leverage a vacant month still requires the full S$5,000 monthly interest bill to be paid out of pocket).
  • Amortizing vs interest-only loans: this example used interest-only financing, which is generous to the property scenario. Most residential mortgages in Singapore amortize, meaning actual monthly cash outflow is higher than the interest-only figure used here.
  • Interest rate risk is amplified at higher leverage. A rise from 2% to, say, 4% on a S$3,000,000 loan adds S$60,000 a year in interest — more than wiping out the entire net cash income calculated above. The same rate move on the unlevered REIT portfolio has no direct effect on the investor's principal (though it can affect REIT unit prices and underlying borrowing costs at the trust level).
  • REIT capital values can fall, sometimes sharply, when interest rates rise — DPU and unit price are not guaranteed, and concentrated single-country or single-sector REITs (China retail exposure via Sasseur, for instance) carry currency and regulatory risks of their own.
  • Selling a property carries Seller's Stamp Duty if sold within the holding period, agent fees, and illiquidity that a REIT portfolio does not have.

The Takeaway

The Singapore property narrative persists because it conflates two separate things: property as a forced savings and leverage vehicle (which works, slowly, mostly through price appreciation over decades) and property as a yield-generating rental investment (which, on the math, lands around 5%–5.5% net cash yield even at aggressive 75% leverage, once financing cost and tax are stripped out — and that's before accounting for six-figure stamp duty at entry, and before the much larger downside if rates rise or the tenant leaves).

A diversified, unleveraged REIT portfolio sidesteps almost every friction point in that equation: no stamp duty, no personal mortgage, no income tax on the distribution, instant liquidity, and exposure spread across ten different property types, tenant bases, and geographies instead of concentrated in one unit with one tenant. The 6.68% net cash yield generated above isn't a forecast or a sales pitch.

For an investor whose goal is the highest sustainable cash income per dollar of capital deployed, the math in Singapore currently points one way and it is not properties.


This article is for educational and illustrative purposes only and does not constitute financial, tax, or investment advice. REIT distribution yields move with unit prices and are not guaranteed; past distributions are not indicative of future payouts. Property rental yields, financing rates, and tax treatment vary by individual circumstance — consult a licensed financial adviser or tax professional before making investment decisions. Figures are approximate, based on publicly available data as of mid-2026, and are intended to illustrate a methodology rather than predict future returns.

Tuesday, 23 June 2026

Portfolio Update June 2026: Accumulating NTT DC, Daiwa Logistics REIT for Dividend Growth

I have made several purchases recently to strengthen my dividend income stream, along with one new position that is more of a vanity project than a pure investment.

Have sold my Frencken Position at $3.53-$3.54

NTT DC REIT – Major Accumulation

Data centre capacity remains in high demand globally. Among the listed data centre REITs available to me, I evaluated NTT DC REIT, Keppel DC REIT and Digital Core REIT.

My view is that Keppel DC REIT has the strongest portfolio, particularly given its significant exposure to Singapore, which is one of the tightest data center markets in the world. However, the market already recognizes this quality and has priced it accordingly, resulting in a rich valuation.

NTT DC REIT, in my opinion, offers the second-best portfolio mix while still trading at a comfortable dividend yield and a discount to book value. This provides a more attractive balance between quality, income and valuation. In particular, I like its exposure to Singapore as well as selected overseas markets where data centre demand remains robust.

As a result, I have made a substantial purchase of NTT DC REIT at a forward yield of approximately 7.8%. This position should materially enhance my dividend income beginning in 2027.

Daiwa House Logistics Trust

I have recently added to my income portfolio as part of a selective expansion into higher-yield industrial real estate with geographical diversification.

Daiwa House Logistics Trust is a Japan-focused logistics REIT with exposure to modern warehouse and distribution assets across key logistics hubs in Japan. Its properties are strategically positioned near major transport corridors and consumption hubs. Tenants typically include e-commerce distributors, and warehouse users such as Suntory and Mitsubishi Express, providing long lease structures and stable cash flow visibility.

Vanity Project – Japan Foods Holding

I have also continued accumulating shares in Japan Foods Holding, to the extent that I should now rank among the company's top 20 shareholders.

From a pure investment perspective, this is not my strongest idea. The company is currently loss-making and remains in the midst of a rationalization and turnaround process. However, I enjoy being a shareholder of a business whose products and outlets I regularly patronise, which is why I consider this a vanity project.

Should management successfully restore profitability, there is potential for dividends to resume from 2027 onwards. While the investment carries execution risk, I am prepared to be patient and see how the turnaround unfolds.

Dividend (Year to Date)

USD $13,060

HKD $9,068.61

SGD $9,068.20

Saturday, 20 June 2026

Why I Am Investing in Two Singapore Listed REITs Delivering More Than 8% Dividend Yield

UI Boustead REIT and Daiwa House Logistics Trust offer distribution yields above 8%, meaningfully higher than most Singapore blue-chip REITs such as Keppel REIT and CapitaLand Ascendas REIT, as well as traditional fixed income instruments. This places them at a clear income premium while still being backed by real asset cash flows.

Beyond yield, both trusts are anchored in logistics and industrial properties supported by long-term structural drivers including e-commerce growth, advanced manufacturing, and global supply chain reconfiguration. These are demand themes that continue to underpin occupancy and rental resilience across cycles.


UI Boustead REIT has a diversified portfolio of industrial, business park, and logistics assets primarily located in Singapore (about 70%+), with the remainder in Japan. Its tenant base is anchored by multinational corporations across engineering, life sciences, aerospace, and technology sectors, including names such as Rolls-Royce, Jabil, GSK, and Razer. This creates relatively stable occupancy supported by mission-critical industrial usage.

Daiwa House Logistics Trust (DHLT) focuses on modern logistics facilities, with the majority of assets located in Japan and a smaller portion in Vietnam. Its properties are strategically positioned near major transport corridors and consumption hubs. Tenants typically include e-commerce distributors, and warehouse users such as Suntory and Mitsubishi Express, providing long lease structures and stable cash flow visibility.

Geographically, the two REITs complement each other well: UI Boustead provides exposure to Singapore’s high-spec industrial and business park office for HQs, while DHLT offers pure-play exposure to Japan’s logistics market, which benefits from Japan's e-commerce, food and beverage products and automation tailwinds.

Investment View

For income investors, the core attraction is the exceptionally high and sustainable cash yield. With both REITs offering 8%+ distributions, investors are effectively locking in a materially higher income stream compared to most blue-chip REITs, government bonds, and fixed deposits. Importantly, this yield is backed by real assets, long lease tenures, and institutional-grade tenants rather than speculative growth assumptions. Combined with moderate leverage levels and strong sponsor backing, the pair provides a compelling balance of income stability and geographic diversification in today’s higher-rate environment.

Tuesday, 26 May 2026

May 2025: New Addition UIBREIT

Dividend came in from Nanofilm, Frencken and Riverstone. Besides, I have bought UIB REIT. This diversifies my dividend sources and importantly, increases my dividend received.

With discovery of high yielding Singapore stocks and sustainable payout, I am now shifting my annual dividend target (for the better, unlike PAP-style goalpost shifting to smoke citizens.)

The dividend target I have set is $100,000. It is an increase from my previous goal of $60,000 because I have bested it due to NTT DC REIT, United Hampshire gains

Dividend (Year to Date)

USD $13,060

HKD $9,068.61

SGD $8,891.20


Sunday, 24 May 2026

UHREIT Growing Dividend Every Year: One of the Highest Yield in Singapore

United Hampshire US REIT ("UHREIT") reported a strong 1Q 2026, with distributable income rising 10.0% year-on-year to US$6.9 million,

Taking it on an annual basis, once can expect about US$26.6 million in distributable income. The real distributable income should be about US$27 million, factoring reduced interest rates and acquistions.

At US$0.52 price per unit/market cap $313 million, this points to 8.5% dividend yield

Sustainable yield (below 100% payout ratio), high yield and consumer resilient tenants in supermarkets, this is turning out to be a good REIT. Based on my cost price, I am earning 10% annual yield on cost.

Prices have gone up, but I am still not selling because it gives 8.5% yield. There are rental escalations built in, this means dividend may keep growing annually.

A good REIT many fund managers have not started buying due to their investment mandate of requiring the REIT to be in tracking indexes. This is hindering fund managers. But as retailers, we are able to purchase it easily and earn 8.5% dividend yield. Eventually fund managers will be forced to buy the REIT when volume picks up

Monday, 27 April 2026

April 2026 Update: Strengthening My Portfolio’s Dividend Power

Over the past week, I have trimmed my position in Nanofilm to take partial profits following its recent share price strength. While I remain constructive on its longer-term prospects, the sharp rebound presented an opportunity to lock in gains and rebalance exposure. As per my previous update, I had sold Alibaba shares amid regulatory uncertainty and a muted consumer recovery in China.

Proceeds from these adjustments have been channelled into NTT DC REIT, primarily for its attractive dividend yield of approximately 7–8%. In the current environment, the ability to generate stable and recurring income is a key priority, and the REIT offers a compelling yield spread relative to other income instruments. This provides a strong foundation for portfolio cash flow while reducing overall volatility.

Beyond yield, NTT DC REIT offers direct exposure to the data centre sector, which is underpinned by powerful structural tailwinds such as cloud adoption, artificial intelligence workloads, and ongoing digitalisation. The quality of its assets, coupled with long-term leases signed with large software companies, supports visibility and resilience of its DPU.

As the year progresses, the portfolio is steadily evolving into a more robust income generator. Dividend contributions are increasing meaningfully, and the $60,000 annual dividend target now appears well within reach.

Dividend

There is no change in the total dividend income received.

Current Portfolio Value is $1,220,400

Dividend

USD:$13,060

HKD:$9,068.61

SGD:$6,507.80


Monday, 20 April 2026

I Took a Loss After 4.5 Years Investing in Alibaba

Today, I sold a partial stake of 1,800 Alibaba HK shares. It marks the end of a position I held for approximately four and a half years — and not in the way I had originally envisioned.

At an average cost of around HKD 142, it’s ironic that after such a long holding period, I still have a realised -1% loss.

What Made Me Decide to Sell

First, Alibaba’s earnings trajectory has largely gone sideways.

Revenue growth has slowed significantly from its earlier high-growth phase, transitioning from rapid expansion into a more mature, slower-growing profile. At the same time, earnings growth has not matched the revenue growth. Despite this, the stock continues to trade at around ~20x price-to-earnings, which is not particularly compelling given the lack of strong growth momentum.

Second, the opprotunity cost of holding Alibaba has been substantial. In Singapore, listed REITs have consistently delivered 5%–7% yields annually, with additional upside from capital appreciation over the past few years. Alibaba has not made much progress. On top of that, capital allocation has been conservative. Buybacks have slowed as the company prioritises AI investments inquiries with Alibaba IR the idea of leveraging low-cost debt to fund more aggressive buybacks while using capital for CAPEX has returned with no interest by the management. It is a signal that Alibaba Management does not feel its shares are too udervalued at current prices. 

Hence, I will be deploying capital to purchase REITs

Sunday, 12 April 2026

April 2026 Portfolio Update: Dividend Growing

Since the last update, I have made 03 additional stock acquisitions:

  1. Lendlease Global Commercial REIT
    The share price fell below its issue price, presenting an attractive entry point. I accumulated shares at an average price of 0.55, which translates to an approximate dividend yield of 6.4%. This represents a reasonable yield for a REIT of its profile.
  2. NTT DC REIT
    I increased my holdings when the share price declined to 0.925. At this level, the stock offers an estimated yield of around 8%, which I consider a strong value proposition.
  3. Yangzijiang Financial

I look forward to achieving higher dividend contributions going forward. From a dividend investment perspective, generating annual returns of 6–8% in Singapore is relatively attainable. By looking beyond the large-cap REITs and selectively investing in mid-cap names such as Lendlease Global Commercial REIT and NTT DC REIT, these levels of yield can be achieved.

In my view, such returns compare favourably against many other asset classes in Singapore, while remaining accessible to the average retail investor.

Dividend

There is no change in the total dividend income received.

Current Portfolio Value is $1,163,500

Dividend

USD:$13,060

HKD:$9,068.61

SGD:$6,507.80


Sunday, 29 March 2026

If the USA Loses The Iran War, Everything Changes

The headlines today are dominated by the conflict between the United States and Iran, with the critical Strait of Hormuz at risk of closure.

At first glance, this may seem like a distant geopolitical issue. It is not.

What is at stake goes far beyond oil supply. If the U.S. fails to achieve a decisive outcome, it could trigger a structural shift in the global financial system—with consequences reaching even Singapore.

US Loss- Decline of Petrodollar and the USD share in global reserves

Today, most global oil trade is denominated in U.S. dollars—the foundation of the “petrodollar” system.
  • Gulf states rely heavily on USD for trade
  • Transactions are largely routed through the SWIFT system

However, a perceived U.S. weakening could change incentives.

Countries may:

  • Shift oil contracts into the Chinese yuan (RMB)
  • Adopt China’s alternative payment system, Cross-Border Interbank Payment System
(Ironically CIPS is faster and cheaper than the West's SWIFT system, just that countries do not want to use it because it is China).

If more countries adopt RMB-based trade: Demand for USD falls, then its share in global reserves declines. Finally the US dollar faces sustained depreciation

This is not unprecedented.

The British Pound Sterling, once the world’s reserve currency, has lost roughly 65% of its value against a basket of currencies over time as it lost its status as the reserve currency.

How it Affects Singapore

Singapore is not insulated from this.

Singapore holds substantial USD-denominated assets, while most liabilities are in Singapore dollars (SGD)

This creates an asset-liability mismatch

If USD depreciates against SGD, the value of our national assets decline, while our liabilities remain unchanged. This erodes balance sheet strength.

As Singapore's government can issue SGD, default risk is low to none. But the trade-off is the potential increase in money supply. More money chasing the same amount of good results in persistent inflation in our country.

The U.S.–Iran conflict is not merely a geopolitical flashpoint—it is a potential inflection point in the global monetary order. Even a gradual shift away from U.S. dollar dominance could reshape trade flows, reprice financial assets, and transmit inflationary pressures across economies tied to the dollar system. For countries like Singapore, which hold substantial USD-denominated assets, the effects may not be immediate but could prove deeply consequential over time. What appears distant today may ultimately surface in more tangible ways—through higher costs of living for Singaporeans.

Saturday, 21 March 2026

Mar 2026 Portfolio Update- $20,000 dividend inflow

Sold off a few shares in both Lendlease REIT and Yanlord. Bought Riverstone

The reporting of year end financial results meant dividend in a few of my holdings have been declared. For this month alone, I would receive US$13,000 and SGD$6,000 in dividend. 

United Hamsphire continue to be the stand out play with high earnings and a high but yet sustainable dividend. The only issue is the low trading liquidity which results in no institutional interest. While the UOB REIT manager has said it is resolving, little results has been seen. Unitholders may have to voice this concern in the upcoming AGM; every month the REIT fails to meet the benchmark to enter Singapore's REIT index, depsite it being the best few performing REIT.

Current Portfolio Value is $1,085,500

Dividend

USD:$13,060

HKD:$9,068.61

SGD:$6,507.80



Saturday, 28 February 2026

2 Singapore Non-REIT Stocks Giving More than 5% Dividend Yield With Upside

Most investors look to the Straits Times Index (STI), but the mid cap space is now worth paying attention with the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) executing the Equity Market Development Programme (EQDP) with about 30% of the government funds set to flow into Singapore-listed mid-cap stocks.

A large portion of these funds has already been allocated to fund managers and will be deployed in 2026. That means mid-caps could see stronger institutional interest.

I’ve filtered three Singapore mid-cap companies with the criterion of:

  • Strong trading liquidity and volume to ensure investors are able to buy and cash out quickly

  • Sustainable dividend

  • Yields above 5%

These companies combine attractive dividend yields with the prospect of increased institutional interest as EQDP capital potentially flows into the mid-cap segment. Given their solid fundamentals and compelling yields, they may deliver competitive — if not superior — total returns relative to MAS-appointed EQDP fund managers.

Riverstone Holdings

Riverstone Holdings Ltd is strongly positioned in the high-margin cleanroom glove segment serving semiconductor, electronics and high-tech industries. It holds the largest global market share in cleanroom gloves.

Unlike commoditised healthcare gloves, cleanroom gloves require:

  • Stricter particle contamination control

  • Electrostatic discharge (ESD) management

  • Consistent high-precision manufacturing standards

These requirements create higher technical and qualification barriers, making the segment structurally more defensible.

Riverstone has built long-standing relationships with global semiconductor customers. Its reputation for reliability supports repeat orders and pricing resilience. Importantly, the cleanroom segment typically generates structurally higher margins than healthcare gloves, giving Riverstone a competitive moat compared to pure healthcare-focused peers.

For FY2025, the company declared a total dividend of 5.5 Singapore cents per share. At a share price of S$0.77, this represents a dividend yield of approximately 7%.

As the company’s production costs and financial results are primarily denominated in Malaysian ringgit, continued appreciation of the ringgit against the Singapore dollar could translate into stronger reported earnings and dividends in SGD terms, potentially enhancing total returns for Singapore-based investors.

Based on my assessment, a fair value of 95 Singapore cents is reasonable, implying a potential capital upside of around 20%. Combined with its dividend yield, Riverstone is an attractive company for investors seeking income and moderate capital appreciation.

ComfortDelgro Corporation Limited (CDG)

ComfortDelGro Corporation Limited is a leading multi-modal land transport operator with a dominant presence in Singapore and an established international footprint.

Its key subsidiaries include:

  • SBS Transit Ltd – operating public buses and rail lines

  • Vicom Ltd – a major vehicle inspection and testing provider

In addition, CDG operates one of Singapore’s largest taxi and private-hire fleets and maintains joint ventures and contracted operations across several overseas markets. Collectively, CDG functions as a diversified transport conglomerate with exposure across multiple transport modes and geographies.

Public transport is an essential service. Commuters rely on buses, trains and taxis for daily travel to work, school and other necessities, making demand relatively resilient even during economic slowdowns.

In Singapore, the regulated contract model enhances revenue visibility. Operators are typically paid based on service kilometres rather than purely on farebox collections, which supports stable and predictable cash flows.

Both SBS Transit and Vicom are benefitting from structural transport policies, including:

  • OBU (On-Board Unit) installation requirements

  • Periodic public transport fare adjustments

For FY2025, CDG declared a total dividend of 8.5 Singapore cents per share; at a share price of s$1.55, translating to a yield of 5.4%.

Based on my assessment, a fair value of S$1.90 is reasonable, as I believe the market is undervaluing an essential service operator with resilient cash flows with too high of a yield (currently above 5% yield); a low 4% yield is where it should be at. This implies a potential upside of about 20% in capital appreciation, excluding dividends, CDG is an attractive company for investors seeking income and moderate capital appreciation.

Friday, 27 February 2026

Asian Pay TV Trust, Reduced Dividend, Reduced Target Price

Asian Pay TV Trust (APTT) has released its full year financial results. Below is a summary

Full Year (2025):
  • Total Revenue: S$245.7 M (down 2.5% vs 2024)
  • EBITDA: S$135.5 M (down 8.7%)
  • Broadband revenue growth: +9.4%
  • Cable TV revenue: Down 7.5% for the year
From 2026, dividend will be reduced from 1.05 cents to 0.8 cents, a 25% reduction. The reduction in DPU was attributed to a sharper-than-expected EBITDA decline in 2025. The Board reduced distributions to prudently manage cash flow and align with onshore loan repayment obligations. The cut was not intended to accelerate debt repayment, but rather to match scheduled loan servicing requirements.

Management expects EBITDA to continue declining and is monitoring the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio to avoid breaching loan covenants. While there remains sufficient headroom currently, they are mindful that debt levels must be reduced in tandem with declining EBITDA.

Dividend from Broadband business is expected to have a slight decrease due to dilution of the enlarged share capital arising from Dada capital injection into the Broadband Industry

APTT Target Price

A dividend of 0.8 SG cents is the new norm. I still maintain the view that demanding a 8% yield for the trust is fair. Hence target price is lowered to 10 SG cents.

Investors should be wary that APTT may turn to equity raising to retire debt to manage the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio in their loan covenants. 

Tuesday, 10 February 2026

Feb 2026 Portfolio Update: Purchase of More Yangzijiang Financial

Following the recent sell-down in Yangzijiang Financial Holdings (YZJFH), I decided to rotate a significant portion of my portfolio into the company. To fund this move, I fully exited my position in StarHub and partial stake in PRIME US REIT. I have accumulated a total stake of 240,000 shares in YZJFH.

Post-restructuring, YZJFH has emerged as a focused debt investment platform with a strong balance sheet, holding only $300,000 of debt against a $1.8 billion loan portfolio. Its loan portfolio currently carries a book value of approximately 54 cents per share, supported by a credit loss allowance of 5.2 cents per share.

Taken together, this implies that if the loan portfolio were to be fully redeemed without drawing down on the credit allowance, the underlying value of the company would amount to roughly 59.2 cents per share. Even allowing for some utilization of the credit allowance, the current market price appears to reflect a substantial discount to underlying asset value.

At a share price of around 33 cents, YZJFH is trading at a significant discount to its adjusted book value. In my view, this valuation presents a compelling risk-reward profile.

Next, a small amount was used to buy Goodwill Entertainment.

Current Portfolio Value is $1,244,000. I am still on track to clock $60k dividend this year

Dividend

USD:$0

HKD:$9,068.61

SGD:$0



Sunday, 8 February 2026

The End of Malaysia Ringgit Weakness: Why 5% Annual Appreciation Is the New Reality

In 2025, something previously considered unthinkable happened: the Malaysian ringgit appreciated by roughly 5% against the Singapore dollar in a single year.

This move was not random. It was driven by a stronger Malaysian economy and a clear increase in foreign direct investment and capital inflows into the country.

In my view, this is not a one-off event. A continued annual appreciation of around 5% is likely to persist for the next few years. As a result, Malaysians holding Singapore assets may continue to experience an erosion of their wealth in ringgit terms, even if Singapore property prices continue to rise.

That outcome may feel uncomfortable, but it is simply the consequence of holding assets denominated in a currency that is no longer structurally strengthening against the ringgit.

Why the 5% Continued Appreciation Will Continue

The 2025 appreciation of the ringgit against the Singapore dollar was widely dismissed as a temporary anomaly. In reality, it marks the start of a multi-year normalization cycle, not a short-term deviation. As of Feb 2026, the Ringgit has already appreciated 1.3% against the Sing Dollar in just under 2 months.

Several structural forces support the case for continued appreciation.

1. Malaysia Has Entered a Sustained Capital Inflow Phase

Malaysia is no longer merely benefiting from a cyclical recovery. It is entering a structural capital inflow phase driven by:

  • Manufacturing reshoring and “China+1” supply-chain strategies

  • Significant investments in semiconductors, data centers, and energy

  • Large-scale infrastructure spending and industrial ecosystem development

Foreign direct investment is sticky capital. Unlike short-term portfolio flows, FDI does not exit quickly based on sentiment or market volatility. As long as Malaysia continues absorbing real, productive investment, structural demand for the ringgit will rise year after year, placing sustained upward pressure on the currency.

This trend is already visible. Even Singapore-based companies, such as AEM, have begun locating manufacturing operations to Malaysia — a clear signal of shifting regional cost and competitiveness dynamics. In the semiconductor logistics supply chain, Malaysia is starting to set up wafer capabilities, this is an add on when the country is already the largest producer of clean room gloves which are used in the semiconductor assembly and testing stages

This is not a one-year story but a multi-year balance-of-payments adjustment.

2. The Productivity and Income Gap Is Narrowing

For decades, the relative strength of the Singapore dollar reflected a widening productivity and income gap between Singapore and Malaysia. That gap is now narrowing rather than widening.

  • Malaysian wages are rising faster than Singapore’s, supporting stronger domestic consumption

  • Higher-value manufacturing and services are expanding within Malaysia

  • Talent retention and skilled labor participation are improving

Currencies ultimately reflect relative productivity trends, not historical reputation. As Malaysia’s economic fundamentals converge toward those of higher-income peers, the exchange rate must adjust accordingly.

3. Property and Capital Inflows Signal Confidence, Not Speculation

Kuala Lumpur — particularly areas such as KLCC — is experiencing a strong property upswing, with substantial foreign capital inflows.

This is not purely speculative activity. It reflects:

  • Improved investor confidence

  • Greater institutional participation

  • A reassessment of Malaysia’s long-term economic trajectory

These inflows reinforce demand for the ringgit and strengthen the currency’s medium-term outlook.

4. Improved Governance and Investor Sentiment

Underlying these trends is renewed confidence in Malaysia’s current government, driven by clearer policy direction, better governance signals, and a more credible reform narrative.

Investor confidence matters. When capital believes in policy continuity and economic management, currency appreciation tends to be persistent rather than temporary

The Bottom Line

The appreciation of the ringgit is likely to continue over the next two years, driven by sustained capital inflows, improving economic fundamentals, and rising investor confidence. On this trajectory, one Singapore dollar could trade near 2.85 ringgit within the end of next year.

If the upcoming Malaysian general election results in the current incumbent government remaining in power, policy continuity and reform momentum would further reinforce confidence in the Malaysian economy. Under such conditions, the uncomfortable truth for many investors is that the ringgit is likely to continue appreciating at approximately 5% per annum with possibility of 2.2 Ringgit mark in 2034. This will mark a clear change of the Malaysia Ringgit being known as a weak currency